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Gregory Klass

Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery
abstract. There is a longstanding debate about whether courts should enforce contract
terms purporting to limit the parties’ liability for fraud. It is less-often noticed that many
contracts are designed to incorporate fraud liability by requiring one party to make
representations about her performance that, if false, can satisfy the elements of deceit. Such
contractual representations are best understood as members of a broader, hitherto
underappreciated category of contract terms: duties designed to increase the other party’s
chances of recovering for breach. Examples include the duty to keep records, to share
information about performance, to permit audits, and not to hide breach. This Article shows that
the logic of proving proximate harm from the breach of such terms entails that legal liability for
such breach often makes a practical difference only when it includes penalties, punitive damages,
or other extracompensatory measures. The Article also demonstrates that most of the costs of
extracompensatory remedies (such as deterring efficient breach) do not apply when those
remedies are attached to duties to cooperate in recovery, and that, in many cases, adopting such
duties is a better solution to underenforcement than damages multipliers. Parties now contract
for liability in fraud, where punitive damages are available, because they cannot get these
remedies in contract. The practical upshot is a new argument against rulings, most recently via a
broad reading of the economic loss doctrine, that there can be no liability in fraud for lies that are
also breaches. Rather than serving the oft-stated goal of protecting the parties’ contractually
chosen allocation of risk, these rules defeat party choice. Even better, however, would be
exceptions to the rules against penalties and punitive damages when those remedies are attached
to the breach of a duty to cooperate in recovery.

author. Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I want to thank Jennifer
Arlen, Guido Calabresi, Richard Craswell, Kevin Davis, Chris Elmendorf, John Mikhail, Jed
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whom added to the ideas in this Article through discussion or comment. I owe special thanks to
Ian Ayres, who suggested that I write down these thoughts during a walk in the Arizona desert.
The Article also benefited from faculty workshops at the University of Virginia Law School and
Georgetown University Law Center, and from discussion at the Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty
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introduction
In 1984, the city of Richmond contracted with McDevitt Street Bovis for
the construction of a new baseball stadium. The stadium was built, but a
decade later the city discovered deterioration in the concrete tubes supporting
the cantilevered roof, caused by McDevitt’s breach of its contractual duty to fill
the tubes with grout. The city sued, claiming both breach of contract and
fraud, the latter based on false certificates of completion and other documents
McDevitt had submitted. In Richmond Metropolitan Authority v. McDevitt Street
Bovis, Inc., the Virginia Supreme Court held that because the contract required
McDevitt to provide the certificates and other documents, misrepresentations
in them might give the city a right to damages for breach, but could not give
rise to liability in fraud.1
McDevitt is a good example of how courts police the border between
contract and tort, protecting contract against, among other things, incursion by
the punitive damages available in tort. But consider the holding’s effect on
Virginia contractors’ decisions whether to submit accurate certificates of
completion. Restricting recovery to the compensatory measures available in
contract means that a Virginia builder who has breached its construction duties
incurs little or no additional liability when it files a false certificate. The false
certificate harms the purchaser first and foremost if it prevents her from
discovering and recovering for nonconforming work.2 To prove that harm—
and even that the certificate was false—the purchaser must first show that the
work was nonconforming, i.e., that but for the false certificate, she would have
recovered for breach. But if the purchaser can show nonconforming work, then
she already has a winning claim for breach of the underlying construction duty,
which will compensate her for her losses. That is, if the purchaser can show
that the false certificate harmed her, it did not. The Virginia Supreme Court’s
decision to limit recovery for false certificates of completion to the
compensatory damages available in contract renders legal liability for breach of
the certification requirement irrelevant.
This strange situation is not limited to certificates of completion in the
building industry. The above argument, or one like it, applies to any contract

1.

2.

4

507 S.E.2d 344, 347 (Va. 1998). In addition to the false certificates of compliance, Richmond
claimed constructive fraud based on McDevitt’s decision to seal the ends of the tubes with
grout, giving the false impression that they had been filled. The Virginia Supreme Court
held that these allegations were “nothing more than allegations of negligent performance of
contractual duties,” and therefore nonactionable as constructive fraud. Id.
There may be other harms as well, such as making recovery more expensive. I consider the
effectiveness of compensatory damages for these harms in infra Subsection I.B.2.
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term whose purpose is to make it easier for the promisee to discover and prove
breach. Common examples include royalty reports, recordkeeping
requirements, certificates of compliance, and auditing rights. Such terms
belong to a hitherto underappreciated genus of contract terms: duties to
undertake acts that promote the other side’s recovery for breach. I will use
“obstruction of recovery” or “obstruction” to refer both to promisor actions
that aim to avoid legal liability and to the failure to act in ways that would
assist in the recovery of damages due where there is a duty to do so. I will use
“cooperation in recovery,” or simply “cooperation,” to designate
nonobstruction.3 Where one side is particularly worried that she might be
unable to recover for any breach, the other side might offer to undertake a
contractual duty to cooperate in recovery—to agree, for instance, not to hide
nonperformance, to keep complete records, or to provide information about
performance.
But here’s the problem: to recover compensatory damages for the breach of
a duty to cooperate, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate harm. The primary
harm of an obstructive breach is that it prevents the promisee from recovering
for breach of the underlying, or first-order, duty. Showing that harm requires
independent proof of first-order breach—that the plaintiff was entitled to the
damages she did not recover. But if the plaintiff can prove first-order breach,
she can recover on that basis—which means that the obstructive breach has not
harmed her. The upshot is a catch-22: a plaintiff can show obstructive harm
only if she has not suffered it.
The way to break out of the circle is to attach extracompensatory
remedies—remedies that are not tied to the plaintiff’s verifiable losses—to
obstructive breach. While the received wisdom is that optimal remedies for
breach are always at or near the expectation measure, this cannot be so when it
comes to duties to cooperate in recovery.4 If such contract terms are to make a
practical difference, they must be backed by punitive damages, penalties or
other remedies neither conditioned on nor limited to compensation for harm
done.

3.

4.

This is a very thin concept of cooperation. My technical use of the term is obviously
different from more demanding or normatively laden concepts of cooperation. See, e.g.,
Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, in FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS
ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 93, 103-05 (1999).
The received wisdom should no longer be that compensatory damage measures are the only
efficient remedies. See Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE
L.J. 568 (2006); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979).
Special transactional situations where the received wisdom does not apply are collected in
Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 33
(2003).
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At present, courts will not enforce a penalty or punitive damages clause,
which brings the analysis back to the potentially positive role of fraud liability.
There is a longstanding debate within the courts and legal scholarship about
whether parties should be able to contract out of liability for their fraudulent
misrepresentations.5 What has not been noticed is that many agreements are
structured to opt into such liability using terms that require one party to
represent that it is not in breach (by submitting, for example, a certificate of
completion). When false, such representations not only breach the contract,
but can satisfy the elements of fraud and support a claim for punitive damages.
The contractual duty to share information about performance can be secured
by the extracompensatory remedies available in fraud.
The existence of such contract terms suggests that parties want effective
duties to cooperate in recovery. And their utility provides additional support
for a thesis Ian Ayres and I have developed elsewhere: that the
extracompensatory remedies available in tort can have “well-defined
function[s] within the apparatus of the law of contracts.”6 Yet, as exemplified
in McDevitt, many courts are uncomfortable with this incursion of
extracompensatory remedies into the world of contracts and have found ways
to exclude fraud liability for acts that are also breaches. The most recent trend
in this direction involves an expansive reading of the economic loss rule to bar
liability for fraud in the performance. This Article argues that such rulings are
mistaken and that courts should recognize the positive role fraud liability can
play in contracts. But the fraud solution is second best. A better solution would
be an exception to the rules against penalties and punitive damages when those
remedies are attached to contractual duties to cooperate in recovery.
Robert Scott and George Triantis have recently observed that “contracts
scholars [have focused] principally on the substantive terms and not on the
ability of the parties to regulate the procedural course of their future

5.

6.

6

The most significant recent decision is the Delaware Chancery Court’s holding in ABRY
Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition L.L.C. that “when a seller intentionally misrepresents a
fact embodied in a contract—that is, when a seller lies—public policy will not permit a
contractual provision to limit the remedy of the buyer to a capped damage claim.” 891 A.2d
1032, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2006); see also id. at 1055-62 (discussing other holdings and
authorities). For recent scholarly discussions, see Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses,
the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-Contractual Misrepresentations, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1999);
and Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Of Fine Lines, Blunt Instruments, and Half-Truths: Business
Acquisition Agreements and the Right To Lie, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2007).
IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT 8
(2005).
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enforcement.”7 This is confirmed by the scholarly neglect of duties to cooperate
in recovery. Such duties are attempts to regulate contract enforcement. This
Article therefore fills in the picture of how parties contract for the case of
breach.8
The Article’s conclusions also bear on an old dispute about Holmes’s
famous dictum that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing
else.”9 This “Holmesian heresy” is sometimes read to mean that, as far as the
law is concerned, the promisor does not have a duty to perform, but an option
to perform or pay damages.10 Holmes himself rejected the alternative-promise
reading, explaining that “the statement that the effect of a contract is the
assumption of the risk of a future event does not mean that there is a second
subsidiary promise to assume that risk, but that the assumption follows as a
consequence directly enforced by the law, without the promisor’s co-

7.

8.

9.
10.

Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J.
814, 857 (2006). For an example of the neglect in a famous source, see L.L. Fuller & William
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 58 (1936) (“If
a contract represents a kind of private law, it is a law which usually says nothing at all about
what shall be done when it is violated. A contract is in this respect like an imperfect statute
which provides no penalties, and which leaves it to the courts to find a way to effectuate its
purposes.”).
The conclusions of this Article are consistent with results in other areas of the law. See, e.g.,
Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the SelfAdjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006) (analyzing sanctions for tax evasion and
avoidance); Ian C. Wiener, Note, Running Rampant: The Imposition of Sanctions and the Use
of Force Against Fleeing Criminal Suspects, 80 GEO. L.J. 2175 (1992) (discussing optimal
penalties for criminal flight).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897), reprinted in
110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 995 (1997).
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 58 (2003) (“Holmes
pointed out that in a regime in which the sanction for breach of contract is merely an award
of compensatory damages to the victim, the entire practical effect of signing a contract is
that by doing so one obtains an option to break it.”); Avery Wiener Katz, The Option
Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV. 2187, 2202 (2004) (“In option terminology, we can
restate Holmes’s point by saying that the promisor holds a call option to buy her way out of
the contract by paying a strike price equal to the value of court-awarded damages.”); Robert
E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in
Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1429 n.1 (2004) (“It is well known that contract
damages effectively give the promisor an option between performing the promise or
breaching and paying damages. The classic statement is by Justice Holmes . . . .”); Seanna
Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 727 (2007)
(“Justice Holmes famously declared that a contract to perform should be understood not as
a promise to perform full stop, but as a promise either to perform or to pay damages.”).
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operation.”11 This Article examines what happens when the parties do make a
“second subsidiary promise” to pay damages—or at least to cooperate in their
recovery. Its surprising result is that mandatory rules limiting contract
damages to compensatory measures mean that even when there is a second
subsidiary promise, legal liability for its breach does not make a practical
difference.
Part I of the Article describes why some parties, including promisors who
know they might breach, should want to contract for legally enforceable duties
not to obstruct recovery, and explains why currently available contract
remedies—which are limited to compensation for actual losses—are often
insufficient to enforce such duties. The core reason is the catch-22 described
above: the promisee who can prove obstructive harm has not suffered it. In
some cases, the effects of the catch-22 can be reduced through recovery for
other harms of obstructive breach, such as delayed compensation and higher
litigation costs, or by liquidating damages. But these alternative grounds of
recovery do not sufficiently protect against obstruction in all contexts.
Part II considers three forms that contractually specified extracompensatory
remedies for obstructive breach might take: the right to terminate the contract,
an adverse inference with respect to first-order breach, and penalties or
punitive damages. The right to terminate works only where the promisor
attaches significant value to the continued existence of the contract, and where
the promisee is not likely already to have the right to terminate based on a
showing of first-order breach. Nor is the adverse inference solution effective
where the promisee has separate proof of first-order breach. I conclude that
only penalties and punitive damages provide generally effective remedies for
obstructive breach. The law of most states presently prevents parties from
contracting for either.
Part III describes how, with no contractual solution available, duties to
cooperate might be secured through the law of torts. The most important
judicial step in this direction was California’s failed experiment with punitive
damages for postbreach obstruction in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service v.
Standard Oil Co. of California.12 A more promising approach can be found in
parties’ attempts to contract for representations of performance backed by
fraud liability, though many courts have closed off this path by adopting
expansive readings of the economic loss rule or similar doctrines. Finally, the

11.

12.

8

OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 302 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1944) (1881); see
also Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious
Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1085-93 (2000).
686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 1984), overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900
P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
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parties can secure limited benefits with representations of intent to cooperate in
recovery, again backed by the law of fraud.
Part IV completes the analysis by arguing that not only are
extracompensatory remedies necessary for effective no-obstruct duties, but the
benefits of cooperative duties are worth the costs of those remedies. Many
familiar costs of penalties and punitive damages, such as deterring efficient
breach, do not apply when they are attached to obstructive breach. And noobstruct clauses backed by penalties or punitive damages are often a cheaper
alternative than a more familiar solution to underenforcement: damage
multipliers.
Before jumping into the analysis, a few words about method. My argument
employs a broadly instrumentalist perspective, in that it assumes that among
contract law’s primary aims is facilitating transactions that would otherwise be
prevented by lack of trust.13 In order to capture practical reasoning in the
absence of trust, I employ nontechnical economic analysis of the self-interested
calculations of individuals entering into and acting within legally binding
agreements. I assume both that each party engages in such cost-benefit analysis
to decide whether to enter into and how to perform under the contract, and
that each tries to anticipate and influence the cost-benefit analysis of his or her
counterpart. In undertaking this analysis, I generally assume that the only
curbs on self-interest are legal ones—that is, the prospect of legal liability for
bad acts. This is of course a theoretical fiction: extralegal norms, sanctions, and
other consequences also enter into the mix. Nor is every decision in a
contractual relationship based on such heartless cost-benefit analysis. But if
contract law has a function in structuring the ongoing relationship between the
parties, it is to substitute where nonlegal mechanisms for coordination,
cooperation, or collaboration do not suffice. Ignoring extralegal norms,
incentives, and reasons is an analytic device for exploring how legal
mechanisms might substitute for them.

13.

See generally DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF
CONTRACT (2003); Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn & Steven M. Maser, A
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 (1989). For a description of the way that trust can play a role in
assuring cooperation in recovery, see ANNETTE C. BAIER, Trust and Its Vulnerabilities, in
MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS 130, 138-39 (1994).

9
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i. the present limitations of contract law
A. Underenforcement and Contract Duties To Cooperate in Recovery
I begin with a more precise description of the category of contract terms
under discussion. These are terms that attempt to address underenforcement—
the fact that many harmful breaches do not give rise to a remedy or equivalent
settlement. The causes of underenforcement are manifold and familiar.
Litigation costs are in some cases so high that it is not worth the bother to sue.
When the parties are in a valuable ongoing relationship, the nonbreaching
party may choose to forgo a lawsuit to secure future deals. Defendants are
sometimes judgment proof. And most important for my purposes, when the
nonbreaching party does sue, insufficient evidence, limited or unbalanced
litigation resources, and court or jury error can conspire to prevent proof of
breach.
The threat of underenforcement can be an obstacle to working out
mutually acceptable terms. Parties enter into a contract when they believe its
benefits outweigh its costs. A contract’s benefits include the opportunity to
recover damages in the case of breach. The value of that benefit depends on the
probability of enforcement, or the likelihood that the promisee will recover
when she has a meritorious breach of contract suit. When in the course of
negotiations party B balks because she is worried about underenforcement, and
party A wants to make the deal happen, A must find a way to sweeten the pot.
A often has a number of options to choose from and will presumably pick the
one that provides B the greatest additional benefit at the least cost to himself.
Thus if the transaction is a simple sale of goods, seller A might offer
concessions in the price or quantity term, additional assurances that he will
deliver conforming goods on time, or a higher damage measure. If buyer B is
particularly worried about underenforcement, A’s cheapest option might be an
additional term designed to promote B’s ability to recover should A breach.
Several categories of contract provisions fit this description. Some contracts
put the payment of damages out of the control of the breaching promisor and
into the hands of the disappointed promisee or a third party. Examples include
security deposits, installment payments, funds held in escrow, and
performance bonds.14 The parties can also contract into alternative adjudicative
procedures that they believe will increase the likelihood of recovery. Choice of

14.

10

For a helpful overview of such mechanisms, albeit with an emphasis more on securing ex
ante reliability rather than ex post compensation, see Ronald J. Mann, Verification
Institutions in Financial Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1999).
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forum and choice of law clauses can be used to opt into more plaintiff-friendly
or less costly legal regimes. Similarly, mediation and arbitration provisions can
increase the probability of enforcement through specialization (the use of
expert adjudicators) and cost savings (lower litigation costs). This second
category also includes procedural tinkering like specialized discovery
procedures or nonstandard burdens of proof.15
This Article examines a third category: contractual duties to cooperate in,
or not obstruct, the promisee’s recovery of damages due her. Obstruction
comes in a variety of flavors. Most obvious is outright dissimulation. Promisors
attempt to hide breach, they try to prevent or delay lawsuits with false
assurances that performance will happen, they lie in court. But not all
obstruction involves misrepresentation. A promisor might destroy records or
other evidence of his nonperformance, transfer or manipulate assets to make
himself judgment proof, or raise frivolous defenses and employ other delaying
tactics in the course of litigation. Finally, my broad definition of “obstruct” is
meant also to capture sins of omission where there is a duty to assist in
recovery. These can include a promisor’s decision not to inform the promisee
of breach, his failure to keep records that would show nonperformance, his
refusal to voluntarily pay damages obviously due, or his noncooperation in
judicial proceedings. Each of these tactics decreases the likelihood that a
meritorious breach-of-contract suit will succeed—both directly, by affecting
legal processes, and indirectly, by increasing the costs of litigation.
Some obstructive behavior is subject to mandatory legal penalties. If a
defendant gives false testimony about the existence of a contract, its content, or
his performance, he commits perjury and risks criminal or civil sanctions. A
promisor who, after nonperformance but before a lawsuit, lies about his intent
to cure might be held liable for fraud.16 Litigation tactics that fall short of
misrepresentation can violate provisions like Rule 11, which permits a court to
sanction pleadings that are “presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.”17 Finally, discovery rules, which are again backed by deterrence

15.
16.

17.

For the parties’ ability to modify discovery procedures, see FED. R. CIV. P. 29. For the
possible use of alternative burdens of proof, see Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 856-78.
AYRES & KLASS, supra note 6, at 165-68. This statement must be qualified by the alreadynoted reluctance of some courts to permit actions for fraud in the contractual setting. See
infra Section III.B.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7 (West 2006); ILL. SUP. CT. R.
137; N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8 (West 2007); TEX. R. CIV. PROC. ANN. 13 (Vernon 2003). But see Chris
William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1384-86 (2006) (observing
the limited scope of criminal and procedural sanctions for detection avoidance).

11
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sanctions, impose affirmative duties to provide information the other side can
use to show nonperformance.
The point of each of these mechanisms is to prevent defendants from
obstructing plaintiffs’ recovery of damages due. None, however, is specific to
the contracts setting. Nor are most contractual in a more technical sense: they
are not duties that the parties have contracted for, or could contract out of.
Rather, they are mandatory or quasi-mandatory rules that apply in all cases, no
matter what any contract between the parties says.18
The question of this Article is what the parties can do when they want
more. In circumstances where these mandatory and quasi-mandatory noobstruct rules provide insufficient protection, how might the parties
supplement those rules with contractual duties to cooperate in recovery?19 In
answering that question, I will focus on a subclass of no-obstruct duties: duties
to create, preserve, or share information about performance and breach.
Examples include terms that require the promisor to create or preserve records,
to inform the promisee of noncompliance, or not to hide breach.20 Such duties
make it easier to verify whether performance has happened and thereby
increase the probability that the promisee will be able to prove any breach in
court. In addition, such terms can reduce litigation costs (by reducing the cost
of information to the promisee) and make performance more observable (by
telling the promisee about it).21 The thesis of this Article is that the law should
allow parties to contract for effective no-obstruct duties of this sort, and that in

18.

19.

20.

21.

12

A rule can be said to be “quasi-mandatory” when the parties have a limited ability to modify
it, though not to contract out of it entirely. Thus Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and many state analogs allow the parties to stipulate to discovery procedures,
though such stipulations are subject to court review to ensure no undue frustration of the
administration of justice. See, e.g., Franklin v. White, 493 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. 1986); Garden
State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A.2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963).
There is an analog to promisor duties to cooperate in recovery: promisee duties not to
falsely allege breach. Many of the arguments below would apply equally to such duties,
though I do not consider them as such.
Examples of noninformational duties to cooperate include requirements that the promisor
keep funds available to pay any first-order damage award, that the promisor remain within
the reach of a jurisdiction, or that the promisor voluntarily pay damages for clear breach.
Many of my conclusions apply to these duties as well, though the details of the argument
and the remedies required are different. For example, as Richard Craswell pointed out to
me, a contractual liquidity requirement might be most effective if its breach triggered
accelerated first-order remedies, such as the right to demand adequate assurance.
I follow here the convention of using “observability” to refer to the parties’ ability to detect
some fact, and “verifiability” to refer to the ease with which that fact can be demonstrated in
court.
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order to do so, it must allow them to attach extracompensatory remedies to the
breach of those duties.
Damage multipliers are another familiar solution to underenforcement.
Where a contractual duty to cooperate adds another layer of regulation to
increase the probability of performance, a multiplier aims to increase the
penalty to the point at which the promisor gets the right risk-adjusted
incentives (compensation multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of
enforcement). I will argue that effective duties to cooperate require an
exception to the rules against penalties and punitive damages. But if we are
going to make an exception to those rules, perhaps it should instead be to give
parties the option of multiplying damages, a solution to underenforcement that
is easier to adopt and to administer. For the moment I simply flag this
objection, leaving its answer for Part IV, after I have developed a more detailed
picture of what effective duties to cooperate would look like. But the basic
answer can be stated now: damage multipliers are more costly than they first
appear. In many cases, contracting for specific duties not to obstruct is the
more efficient means of realizing the benefits of contractual liability.
B. Compensatory Remedies
The limitations of compensatory damages when it comes to deterring
obstructive behavior are nicely illustrated by a memo that came to light in
Alabama’s recent suit against Exxon for nonpayment of oil and gas royalties.22
In the early 1980s, Alabama entered into twenty-two oil and gas leases with
Exxon on terms that were unusually favorable to the state, in that they
prohibited Exxon from deducting many of the usual costs from its royalty
payments.23 As with most royalty contracts, the leases also required that Exxon
provide royalty reports, documenting the basis for its payments.24 In 1999,
Alabama sued Exxon for underpayment of royalties. The jury found that in
1993 Exxon formulated a plan to take prohibited cost deductions.25 In a memo
to a senior vice president, executives argued that Alabama’s “inexperienced
regulatory staff and processes,” which were already engaged in a complicated
audit of Shell Oil, were unlikely to detect the proposed underpayments.26

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 859 So. 2d 1096 (Ala. 2002);
Post-Judgment Order, Alabama v. Exxon Corp., No. 99-2368 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2004).
859 So. 2d at 1100; Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 9.
Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 21, 52-54.
Id. at 19-22.
Id. at 21.
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Moreover, they argued, Exxon’s exposure if caught would be only the
underpayment plus twelve percent annual interest.27 Exxon apparently
concluded that falsely reporting royalties was “a no-lose proposition.”28 As the
trial court explained:
The downside associated with any detection of its underpayment was
nonexistent from Exxon’s perspective: it was certain that the very most
it would have to pay the State would be what it already owed, the
amount of its underpayment. . . . [E]ven if the State sued and won,
Exxon knew that its return on the monies it withheld would in any
event substantially exceed the 12% simple interest penalty it might
ultimately have to pay. Thus, Exxon’s scheme was tantamount, it
thought, to a cost-free, risk-free option.29
The familiar point here is this: where enforcement is imperfect, compensatory
damages do not sufficiently deter breach, especially opportunistic breach. But
there is a deeper lesson as well. Exxon breached not only its duty to pay
royalties, but also the duty to provide accurate accountings. That reporting
duty was presumably put in place to guard against, and ensure recovery for,
any breach of the underlying duty to pay. While compensatory damages
provided too little deterrent against underpayment, they provided no deterrent
against false royalty reports. Alabama could show that the royalty reports were
false only if it could also demonstrate underpayment. But if Alabama could
show underpayment, it could recover for the first-order breach on that basis,
and the false reports caused it no actual harm. In fact, Exxon’s defense team
attempted to rely on just this logic, arguing that “although Exxon withheld tens
of millions of dollars in royalties owed under the leases, the State suffered zero
detriment [as a result of the false reports, because] the harm from its

27.
28.
29.

14

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21 (citations omitted). A similar description of the same dynamic can be found in the
legislative history of a California bill that would have penalized recording companies for
underpaying and misreporting royalties. The bill’s sponsor, Senator Murray, explained:
“[T]his bill addresses the core issue that has allowed record companies to under-report
royalty earnings without any penalty. . . . Under the current structure, there is no
disincentive or penalty if record companies do not properly account royalties to artists;
therefore, bad behavior is rewarded.” Cal. Assem. Comm. on Arts, Entertainment, Sports,
Tourism, and Internet Media, Bill Analysis, S. 1034, 2002-2003 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1-2 (Cal.
2003) (as amended May 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Murray), available at http://
info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1034_cfa_20030630_102556_asm
_comm.html.
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underpayments is now ‘fully compensated through the contract damages.’”30
So long as recovery for breach of the reporting duty required a proof of actual
harm, Exxon would be off the hook.
The trial court escaped the dilemma by finding a substantial basis not only
for compensatory breach of contract damages, but also for a punitive award
based on Exxon’s fraud.31 (That decision is currently on appeal, and is awaiting
a ruling by the Alabama Supreme Court.32) Part III discusses how this fraud
solution can work. But before getting there, or even to contractual solutions,
we need a more general understanding of the limitations of compensatory
damages when it comes to securing effective duties to cooperate in recovery.
That understanding has three components. The first is the catch-22 Exxon
relied on: the proof structure of compensatory damages for obstructive breach
is such that a plaintiff can prove actual harm only if she has not suffered it. The
catch-22, however, only applies to the most obvious obstructive harm: the
promisee’s inability to recover for first-order breach. It is also necessary to
show that the problem is not solved by recovery for other losses, which include
increased litigation costs, delayed recovery, and inability to mitigate. Finally,
there is the possibility that liquidated damages are a solution. I conclude that
so long as liquidated damages are subject to the rule against penalties, they do
not solve the problem.
1. The Catch-22
A more detailed account of the catch-22 begins with a distinction between
two types of obstructive behavior. Recall that in my artificial use of the term,
obstruction includes both affirmative acts (such as misrepresentations about
performance or the destruction of records) and failures to act (not informing
the promisee that a breach has occurred or failing to keep records, where there
is a duty to do one or the other). Cutting across this distinction between active
and passive obstruction is a difference between how obstruction is proven in
court. I will call obstruction “independent” if it can be demonstrated without
first showing that there was a first-order breach. Other obstruction is

30.

31.
32.

Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 32; see also Reis v. Peabody Coal Co., 997 S.W.2d 49,
68, 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting the fraud defendant’s argument that the plaintiff
incurred no actual damages because plaintiff had already recovered for breach of the royalty
contract in arbitration).
Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 19-37, 62.
Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., No. 1031167 (Ala. filed Apr. 30,
2004).
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“dependent,” which is to say capable of proof only by first showing breach of
the underlying duty.
An example will illustrate the difference and be useful in the analysis that
follows. Suppose Developer is deciding whether to hire Contractor to install
high-speed network wiring in a residential building she is constructing.
Developer is concerned about underenforcement. In particular, she is worried
that nonconforming work may be both unobservable, because Developer does
not have the necessary expertise, and unverifiable, because the wiring will be
built into the walls and it will not be worth tearing the building apart to prove
breach. Contractor, aware of Developer’s concerns, suggests adding a
recordkeeping clause, which will require Contractor to keep detailed records of
materials and work performed.
There are two relevant ways Contractor might breach the recordkeeping
clause. First, he could fail to keep any of the required records. That breach
would, in my terminology, be a form of independent obstruction, for Developer
can show that Contractor did not keep the records whether or not she can show
faulty installation. Other examples of independent obstruction include the
refusal to allow audits, nonprovision of required performance reports, and
destruction of evidence. Alternatively, Contractor might breach the
recordkeeping clause by falsifying the required records to cover up the faulty
installation. In order to demonstrate that obstructive breach, Developer would
have to show that the records were false, that is, that the installation was in fact
noncompliant. Falsifying records is generally a form of dependent obstruction,
for its proof depends on a showing of first-order breach. Among the other
varieties of dependent obstruction are not reporting a first-order breach, hiding
it, and providing false performance reports.
The distinction between independent and dependent obstruction marks a
difference between types of obstructive behavior, not between no-obstruct
duties. Thus breach of the recordkeeping clause is either independent or
dependent, depending on the manner of noncompliance. The breach of some
duties to cooperate, however, is necessarily dependent. Suppose Contractor
agrees instead to a reporting clause, which requires that he immediately
disclose any nonconforming work. That duty has noncompliant installation as
its condition precedent. To prove obstructive breach—failure to report—
Developer must first prove satisfaction of the condition precedent, which is a
first-order breach.
With these distinctions in hand, I now turn to the functioning of
unliquidated compensatory damages for the most salient harm of obstructive
breach: the promisee’s inability to recover for first-order nonperformance.
(The next Section will consider the effects of compensation for other harms.)
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Consider the situation where Contractor has falsified required records,
which is a dependent obstructive breach (proving the records false presupposes
showing noncompliant installation). Either Developer has separate sufficient
evidence of the first-order breach or she does not. If Developer has the
evidence, she can prove that Contractor breached his duty to install. She can
therefore recover for the first-order breach, and the falsified records have not
caused her the relevant loss. If Developer cannot prove first-order breach, then
(assuming Contractor breached the duty to install) Developer has been harmed
by Contractor’s failure to keep accurate records. Such records would have
demonstrated the noncompliant installation and permitted recovery for the
first-order breach. But without proof of noncompliant installation, Developer
cannot prove that the records are false—that is, she cannot prove obstructive
breach. Either way, breach of the duty to cooperate in recovery costs
Contractor nothing.
The recordkeeping clause requires Contractor to take affirmative steps to
assist Developer’s recovery for the first-order breach. But the result is the same
for the dependent breach of no-obstruct duties that prohibit bad behavior.
Thus suppose the parties adopt instead a no-conceal clause, requiring that
Contractor not attempt to hide noncompliant installation. The duty not to
conceal applies only if Contractor is in first-order breach, so breach of the noconceal clause is necessarily dependent. If Contractor is deciding whether or
not to cover up his faulty work, the threat of compensatory damages will not
affect his decision. Should his attempt to hide the first-order breach succeed,
he will not be held liable for the obstructive breach; should it fail, Developer
then has independent proof of the noncompliant installation, and the salient
harm of obstructive breach did not occur.
The general and inherent limitation of compensatory damages for
dependent obstructive breach is this: if the promisee cannot demonstrate firstorder breach, she cannot prove the dependent obstructive breach and recovers
nothing for the obstructive breach. If the promisee can demonstrate first-order
breach, she can recover for the first-order breach on the basis of that
demonstration alone. Because the obstructive breach has not caused her the
salient harm, there is no loss to compensate, so again she recovers nothing for
the obstructive breach. So long as the remedy is limited to compensatory
damages, the duty to cooperate makes no practical difference.
The same result holds for independent obstruction, though here the
problem is not proof of the obstructive breach, but proof of proximate harm.
Suppose Contractor breaches the recordkeeping clause not by falsifying
records, but by failing to keep them. In that case, it may be easy for Developer
to prove obstructive breach, in part because proof of no records does not
depend on a showing of noncompliant installation. But to recover
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compensatory damages, Developer must also be able to show that the
obstructive breach harmed her. On the present assumptions, this means
showing that Contractor’s failure to keep records prevented her recovery for a
first-order breach. Again there are two possibilities. If, despite Contractor’s
failure to keep records, Developer discovers and can prove nonconforming
installation, Developer can recover for the first-order breach. In that case,
Developer has not suffered the salient obstructive harm, and, so long as
damages are limited to compensatory measures, there is no recovery. If
Developer cannot prove nonconforming installation, then she cannot prove
that but for the failure to keep records, she would have recovered for a firstorder breach. Again there is no recovery for the obstructive breach, now
because she cannot show that the obstruction caused her the relevant loss.
This second version of the catch-22 is even more general. To show the most
salient harm of an obstructive breach, dependent or independent, the promisee
must show that, but for the obstruction, she would have recovered for the firstorder breach. That is, she must prove that she has a meritorious claim for
breach of the underlying duty. But this is precisely what she cannot do if the
obstructive breach was successful. The result is a win-win situation for the
promisor. If his obstructive breach succeeds (that is, the promisee cannot prove
first-order breach), the promisee cannot prove proximate harm and so recovers
nothing. If the obstructive breach is unsuccessful, the promisee can prove firstorder breach and so suffers no compensable loss. Once again, there is no
possible world in which compensatory damages for the obstructive breach
make a practical difference.
2. Other Losses: Avoidable Harms, Delayed Recovery,
and Litigation Costs
The catch-22 I have identified applies to unliquidated compensatory
damages for the most salient and potentially costly harm of obstructive breach:
the promisee’s inability to recover for first-order breach. But obstruction not
only decreases the chance of first-order recovery, it also increases its cost. The
promisee will have to spend more to discover and prove first-order breach, and
recovery may be delayed, costing the promisee the earlier use of the funds. And
obstruction can make first-order breach not only more difficult to verify (by a
legal factfinder), but also to observe (by the promisee), preventing her from
taking early actions to avoid loss. Increased litigation costs, delayed recovery,
and the inability to mitigate do not redound to the benefit of the promisor.
Forcing him to internalize those secondary costs of his obstructive breach
might therefore tip the scales against the benefit he expects to receive from
avoiding liability, thereby deterring obstructive breach. If compensation for the
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most salient harm of obstructive breach, inability to recover, makes no practical
difference, compensation for its secondary harms might.
Parties need not add no-obstruct terms to their contract to recover for the
secondary harms of obstruction. Fee-shifting and prejudgment interest clauses
make the promisor found to have breached liable for all of the promisee’s
litigation and delay costs. And the mitigation rule (“a party cannot recover
damages for loss that he could have avoided by reasonable efforts”33) forces the
promisor to internalize the costs of withholding information about breach: the
longer the promisee remains in the dark, the longer she will be unable to take
reasonable efforts to avoid losses, and the greater the promisor’s liability.
My analysis of the parties’ interest in securing incentives against
obstruction of recovery casts new light on these familiar mechanisms.
Proponents of fee shifting, for instance, often emphasize its value as a deterrent
to frivolous lawsuits.34 Less commonly noticed is the flip-side: fee shifting also
deters obstruction, since the more the defendant obstructs recovery, the greater
the plaintiff’s litigation costs, which the defendant will have to pay if he loses.
Similar arguments apply to prejudgment interest awards and the mitigation
rule. In addition to their other benefits, these mechanisms encourage
cooperation in recovery.
In fact, such mechanisms have an important advantage over more narrowly
tailored no-obstruct terms. Contractually specified duties not to obstruct
function only if the parties can identify, at the time of formation, specific
behaviors likely to affect the probability of recovery. Fee shifting, prejudgment
interest, and the mitigation rule, on the other hand, capture all obstructive
behavior, whether identified in advance or not.

33.
34.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b (1981).
Discouraging frivolous lawsuits is but one of the claimed advantages of fee shifting. See, e.g.,
W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States
the “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 399-430
(1999) (arguing that fee shifting can reduce the number of lawsuits and ensure access to
litigation); Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, A Reputation for Being a Nuisance: Frivolous
Lawsuits and Fee Shifting in a Repeated Play Game, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 147 (1998)
(finding that fee shifting can reduce frivolous litigation costs, where lawyer reputation is
relevant); James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English
and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1995) (finding that efficient
settlement, costs, and successful plaintiff suits are more common under the English rule);
Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 1161-63
(1996) (arguing that fee shifting can diminish speculative lawsuits, can decrease litigation
costs, and is more fair); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1590-93 (1993) (describing common
arguments against the American rule).
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There are therefore two relevant questions. First, do compensatory
damages for the breach of tailored no-obstruct terms add anything to these
existing mechanisms? Second, can compensation for the secondary harms of
obstruction—whether in the form of compensatory damages for obstructive
breach or pursuant to more familiar means—provide the promisee sufficient
protection against obstructive behavior?
The one place where tailored no-obstruct duties provide a clear advantage
over other modes of recovery is the extra litigation expenses caused by
independent obstructive breach.35 Fee-shifting clauses typically provide for the
recovery of attorneys’ fees and other costs only if the promisee can show firstorder breach. But a promisee might prove an independent obstructive breach
even if she cannot prove the first-order breach. If she can recover litigation
costs solely because of the obstructive breach, the no-obstruct term provides
greater protection than a fee-shifting clause. Thus suppose Contractor has
failed to keep any of the records required by the recordkeeping clause. That
obstructive breach will increase Developer’s recovery costs—Developer has to
invest more to confirm Contractor’s performance, or to discover and prove
noncompliant installation. While a fee-shifting clause allows Developer to
recover these costs only if she proves first-order breach, compensatory damages
for the obstructive breach should mean Developer recovers them whether or
not she can show noncompliant installation.36 Because proof of no records is
independent of and more likely than proof of the underlying breach, litigation

35.

36.
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The plausibility of recovery of attorney fees for obstructive breach is demonstrated by some
contemporary reactions to California’s experiment with punitive damages for obstruction of
recovery in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
See C. Delos Putz, Jr., & Nona Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees—Not Tort
Liability—Is the Remedy for “Stonewalling,” 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 499 (1987); Dana Rae
Landsdorf, Note, California’s Detortification of Contract Law: Is the Seaman’s Tort Dead?, 26
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 238 (1992) (“Contracting parties who deny—in bad faith—the
existence of a contract should be liable for all damages proximately caused and resulting
from such conduct. For example, the breaching party should not only be liable for
compensatory damages but also for the injured party’s attorney’s fees because the nonbreaching party does not expect to incur attorney’s fees from the transaction.”).
It might be thought that no court would award litigation costs without proof of first-order
breach, the idea being that such recovery would give promisees a perverse incentive to sue.
That thought overlooks the fact that compensatory litigation-cost damages for breach of an
anti-obstruction clause should be limited to costs attributable to the defendant’s obstructive
behavior. Litigation-cost recovery for breach of the recordkeeping clause would not give
Developer a free suit on the first-order breach. It would, however, support her expenditure
of extra resources to determine whether there was a first-order breach—expenses that would
be unnecessary but for Contractor’s failure to keep the required records. Developer should
be permitted to recover these costs whether or not she sues for the underlying breach, and if
she does sue on the underlying breach, whether or not she prevails in that suit.
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cost recovery for the obstructive breach provides greater assurances against that
form of obstruction than a simple fee-shifting provision would.
Compensation for the other secondary harms of obstructive breach—delay
in recovery and inability to mitigate—is in all cases more effectively
accomplished using prejudgment interest clauses or the mitigation rule,
regardless of whether the obstruction in question is dependent or independent.
Compensation for delayed recovery presupposes proof that recovery was
warranted, which is to say, a showing of first-order breach. Thus delayedrecovery damages for obstructive breach provide no greater protection than a
simple prejudgment interest clause, which compensates for all delays upon
proof of first-order breach. Recovery for losses that could have been avoided
but for the obstructive breach similarly presupposes proof that those losses are
attributable to first-order breach. If the promisee can show first-order breach,
the mitigation rule already permits recovery for those losses, since ex hypothesi
they were not avoidable. A similar argument applies to litigation costs resulting
from dependent obstructive breach.
This answers the first question: compensatory damages for the secondary
harms of obstructive breach provide at best only slightly more protection
(litigation costs for independent obstructive breach) against obstruction than
more familiar and broadly effective mechanisms like fee shifting, prejudgment
interest, and the mitigation rule. The remaining question is this: How much
protection does liability for these secondary harms, whether based on specific
no-obstruct terms or on the generic mechanisms, provide? Is liability a
sufficient deterrent against obstruction to protect the promisee against
obstruction’s more salient harm—the inability to recover for first-order breach?
Common sense, and examples like Exxon’s relative indifference to the
twelve percent interest charge on unpaid royalties,37 suggest that the answer is
often “no.” Forcing the promisor to internalize the costs to the promisee of
delayed recovery, more complex litigation, and the inability to mitigate is not
enough. In many cases, these costs of obstruction will be outweighed by the
potential payoff: avoiding first-order liability. This commonsense judgment is
based on three facts. First, because the promisor generally pays for the
secondary harms of obstruction only if the promisee can show first-order
breach (the only exception being litigation costs for independent obstructive
breach), he discounts those costs by the chance of no first-order liability, an
eventuality that obstruction makes all the more likely. As a result, the promisor
internalizes a diminished portion of secondary costs of his obstructive tactics.
Second, should the promisor be held liable, the added cost of his obstructive

37.

See supra text accompanying note 29.
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behavior will not be all of the promisee’s secondary costs, but only those
attributable to the obstruction. For instance, litigation-cost recovery does not
force the promisor to pay for all of the promisee’s attorney fees, but only for
fees caused by the promisor’s obstructive behavior. These figures are likely to
be orders of magnitude less than the damages for the underlying breach that
the promisor might hope to avoid. Finally, the potential upside of
obstruction—the increased chance that the plaintiff will not recover and the
defendant will not have to pay anything—can be very large. This is so when the
remedy for the underlying breach is costly or there is a high probability that the
obstruction will succeed. The latter case is particularly relevant, since effective
obstruction both lowers the likelihood that the promisor will have to pay for its
secondary harms (the first point above) and means a big gain in terms of
avoiding first-order liability. In a great many cases, therefore, compensatory
damages for the secondary harms of obstructive breach provide insufficient
protection against obstruction’s primary harm, no recovery for first-order
breach.
3. Liquidated Damages for Obstructive Breach
The conclusion so far: unliquidated compensatory damages for obstructive
breach will, in many cases, do little or nothing to deter the promisor who
would otherwise obstruct recovery. The primary reason for this is the catch-22
embedded in the proof of harmful obstructive breach. To prove the most
significant harm of the breach (that the obstruction prevented recovery), and
sometimes even to prove that there was a breach (in the case of dependent
obstruction), the promisee must be able to show a first-order breach; but if she
can do that, she can recover on the basis of that showing alone, and the
obstructive breach did not cause her that harm. While recovery for secondary
harms (increased litigation costs, delayed recovery, inability to mitigate)
provides some measure of deterrence, we can predict that in many cases it will
not be enough to assure a promisee who is worried that the promisor will not
cooperate in recovery.
Liquidated damages relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving harm.
Given that the catch-22 turns in part on the promisee’s ability to prove actual
loss, it is natural to ask whether a liquidated damages clause cannot resolve it.
Closer examination will show that, like recovery for secondary harms,
liquidated damages can provide some additional protection. But contractually
specified damage amounts are limited by the compensation principle, in the
form of the rule against penalties. As a result, liquidated damages cannot do
the whole job. (Section III.C shows that penalties can be effective against
obstruction.)
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To analyze how compensatory liquidated damages for obstructive breach
might work, let me return to Contractor’s agreement with Developer to install
network wiring. Assume now that their contract liquidates damages for firstorder breach at $10,000, which represents the parties’ reasonable estimate of
the replacement cost for defective wiring. Suppose further that the contract
includes the recordkeeping clause, and that Developer and Contractor want to
liquidate damages for its breach as well.
The rule against penalties requires that damages be liquidated “at an
amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss,” and
states that a “term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is
unenforceable . . . as a penalty.”38 So, in seeking out an enforceable liquidated
damage amount, the parties must predict what breach of the recordkeeping
clause is likely to cost Developer. Putting aside the secondary harms discussed
in the previous section (which often pale in comparison to the inability to
recover for first-order breach), breach of the recordkeeping clause will harm
Developer only if two conditions are met: Contractor has breached the
agreement to install, and the missing or false records prevent Developer from
proving first-order breach. If both conditions are satisfied, Contractor’s
obstructive breach costs Developer $10,000—the amount she would have
recovered in liquidated damages had she been able to show noncompliant
installation. If either condition is not satisfied—if Contractor has performed
the installation correctly, or if Developer can prove noncompliant installation
despite the missing or falsified records—the obstructive breach costs Developer
nothing.
So, at what amount should the parties liquidate damages? If an obstructive
breach causes Developer a significant harm, it will be in the amount of
$10,000—the first-order liquidated damages amount. But it is hard to imagine
a situation in which a court would award $10,000 for the faulty records. If
Developer can show improper installation despite the obstructive breach, she
can already recover $10,000 in first-order damages, and the $10,000 in
liquidated damages for obstructive breach would mean double recovery. If
Developer cannot show improper installation, the court is likely to balk at so
large an award where there is proof of nothing more than faulty recordkeeping.
To satisfy the compensation principle, Developer and Contractor will
therefore choose some lower amount, say $1,000, and stipulate that it
represents the cost to Developer of the decreased chance of proving first-order
breach—in mathematical terms, the expected percentage-point decrease in
probability of enforcement, multiplied by the value of a first-order damage

38.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (2006).
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award. Now suppose Developer can prove breach of the recordkeeping clause,
say by showing that Contractor failed to keep any records, though she cannot
prove noncompliant installation. A court might still enforce the $1,000 in
liquidated damages, reasoning that the $1,000 amount is a reasonable riskadjusted forecast of damages and allowing for the possibility that there is an
unverified first-order breach. The $1,000 liquidated damages amount will
protect Developer against obstructive breach, however, only if it correctly
captures the effect of improper recordkeeping. If failure to keep the required
records decreases the probability of enforcement by ten percentage points or
less, the $1,000 liquidated damages amount is enough.39 But if the obstruction
is more effective, liquidated damages will have to be increased. And the greater
the liquidated damage amount, the less likely the court is to enforce it where
the promisee cannot show any actual loss. If no records will result in, for
example, a fifty percentage-point decrease in the likelihood of enforcement,
liquidated damages will have to be at least $5,00040—an amount that begins to
look like a penalty for what, as far as the court knows, may be no more than a
bookkeeping error.
The underlying problem is that courts find it difficult to assess the
reasonableness of damages where the very existence of a loss (not just its
amount) depends on nonverifiable facts—in this case, whether or not there was
a first-order breach. As a result, liquidated damages must be reduced to take
account of the possibility, in the court’s mind, of first-order performance. But
the promisor deciding whether to obstruct recovery is likely to know whether
there has been or will be a first-order breach. And this means that the reduced
liquidated damage amount will not be enough to convince him to cooperate in
recovery.
This is not to say that liquidated damages are not an improvement in cases
where the promisee cannot show first-order breach. Where unliquidated
compensatory damages result in no recovery (the catch-22 of proving
damages), liquidated damages can impose some cost on and provide some
insurance against obstructive breach. Nonetheless, the penalty rule will tend to
push enforceable damage amounts below what is needed to fully deter or
insure against obstruction.
The last hypothetical, however, describes a situation where the promisee
cannot prove first-order breach but can show obstructive breach, which is
possible only where the obstruction is independent (such as failure to keep
records). What about where the promisee can demonstrate both?

39.
40.
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Many courts follow the Second Restatement rule that “[i]f . . . it is clear
that no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum as damages
is unenforceable.”41 The reasoning is this: if it is certain that the promisee has
suffered no loss, liquidated damages fail their essential purpose, for the amount
of actual loss is not difficult to prove.42 Now suppose Developer can prove that
Contractor failed to keep the records required by the recordkeeping clause, but
she can also show noncompliant installation. If the court follows the Second
Restatement, Contractor has a good argument against any liquidated damages
award for his obstructive breach. Proof of noncompliant installation entitles
Developer to the $10,000 first-order liquidated damages amount, from which
it follows that the obstructive breach did not significantly harm her.
This last dynamic is fatal when it comes to dependent obstructive breach—
where proof of obstruction requires first showing a first-order breach. If an
obstructive breach is dependent, the plaintiff can show obstructive breach only
when the defendant can show that that breach did not cause the plaintiff a
significant loss. In jurisdictions that follow the Second Restatement rule,
liquidated damages for dependent obstructive breach should never be
enforceable. Any liquidated damage award for obstruction—be it $1,000, $100,
or $10—is a pure penalty.
This may even be the case in jurisdictions that do not follow the no-loss,
no-liquidation rule, though the small number of decisions makes it difficult to
be certain. Williston suggests that whether a court will award liquidated
damages where there is proof of no loss depends on the extent to which the
jurisdiction considers actual losses (as opposed to anticipated losses) in
evaluating the reasonableness of the liquidated damages amount.43 But in the
case of dependent obstructive breach (and recall that the breach of some noobstruct terms is always dependent), we get the same result whether
reasonableness is evaluated ex ante or ex post. Unlike other sorts of breach, we
can say in advance that if a plaintiff can prove dependent obstructive breach,
the defendant will be able to show no significant loss. Even from the ex ante
perspective, liquidated damages for dependent obstruction will be available
only where the amount of loss is certain—namely, where it is demonstrably
zero. Liquidated damages for dependent obstructive breach violate both the

41.
42.

43.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b (2006); see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 12.18, at 814-15 (4th ed. 2004).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 illus. 4 (2006); see also id. § 356(1)
(“Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an
amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach
and the difficulties of proof of loss.” (emphasis added)).
24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 65:33 (4th ed. 2006).
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rule against penalties and the rule that damages may only be liquidated when
actual loss is difficult to prove.
The above observations about when courts are likely to enforce liquidated
damages attached to duties to cooperate are based not on decisions considering
such terms, but on the rules that govern liquidated damages generally. It might
well be that, if presented with the above arguments, a court might relax the
rules against penalties and proof of actual loss so as to allow the recovery of
higher liquidated damages for obstructive breach. Such an outcome, however,
would also mean a retreat from the compensation principle, confirming the
broader thesis of this Part.
*

*

*

The above analysis has shown how the compensation principle
systematically pushes damage amounts below the level necessary fully to deter
or insure against obstructive breach. The core cause is the catch-22 that inheres
in proof of actual loss. Obstruction harms the promisee first and foremost by
decreasing the probability of first-order recovery. But a plaintiff who can prove
that harm has not suffered it: to demonstrate the harm, the plaintiff must show
that but for the defendant’s obstruction, she would have recovered for firstorder breach; if she can prove that, she can recover on that basis alone, and the
obstructive breach did not cause her the harm. The proof structure that gives
rise to the catch-22 infects other modes of compensation as well. Recovery for
the secondary harms of obstructive breach—additional litigation costs, delayed
recovery, and otherwise avoidable losses—provide some measure of deterrence.
But in many cases it will not be enough to dissuade a promisor who would
otherwise choose to obstruct recovery, in part because recovery for secondary
harms often depends on proof of first-order breach—proof that obstruction
makes all the less likely. Liquidated damages, too, can partly avoid the catch-22.
But the rule against penalties significantly diminishes their utility. Where there
is no proof of first-order breach, liquidated damages for obstruction can appear
unduly harsh, and where there is such proof, liquidated damages create double
recovery and violate the no-loss, no-liquidation rule.
It would be wrong to draw too strong a conclusion. Recovery for secondary
harms and liquidating damages can provide some protection against
obstruction. And for some parties that is enough. This could be so because the
cost of liability for secondary harms or the enforceable liquidated damages
amount is greater than the promisor’s expected gains from obstructing
recovery (where, for example, obstruction has a low probability of success). It
could also be so where there are other, nonlegal reasons not to obstruct. In
relational contracts the threat of no future dealings might alone be enough to
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ensure cooperation. And in industries that are highly organized or composed of
repeat players, reputational or other nonlegal sanctions can deter obstructive
behavior. But where there is a significant threat of obstruction and these
extralegal protections are not available, the parties are likely to want more than
contract law presently provides them.
ii. extracompensatory contract remedies
The analysis in Part I has shown that, in many cases, effective duties not to
obstruct require extracompensatory remedies. A contract remedy is
extracompensatory if its application is not tied to the magnitude of harm
caused. The extralegal sanctions mentioned above—no future dealings and loss
of reputation—are extracompensatory in just this sense. (The reputational
costs of obstructing recovery, for instance, might be much greater than the
promisee’s losses.) This Part describes three sorts of extracompensatory legal
remedies the parties might apply to obstructive breach.44 The first is
termination of the contract, which is effective only when the promisor has not
yet realized the contract’s entire value, and then only when the promisee does
not already have the right to terminate. The second is a contractually specified
adverse inference, where the parties stipulate that proof of obstruction shall tip
the evidentiary scales for a showing of first-order breach. Adverse inferences
can be effective against independent obstructive breach, but for obvious

44.

Specific performance also qualifies as extracompensatory under my definition, but timing
issues prevent it from being effective against most sorts of obstruction. An injunction
ordering subsequent performance cannot undo the damage caused by destroyed records,
hidden or unreported first-order nonperformance, delay tactics, and most other forms of
obstruction.
One exception is contractual duties to permit audits. Thus 10 U.S.C. § 2313 (2000),
which gives the Department of Defense the right to audit records of certain contractors, also
gives it the power, enforceable by the district court, to subpoena those records. This is
equivalent to a mandatory audit term supported by specific performance. California has
recently legislated mandatory auditing rights in recording contracts, though without
specifying the remedy for their breach. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2501 (West Supp. 2007). At some
point the California courts will have to decide what the appropriate remedy is. My analysis
suggests that it should be specific performance, an adverse inference, or some other
extracompensatory measure.
Yet other remedial options are available where the promisor is a corporate entity and
liability for first-order and obstructive breaches (or rewards for cooperation) can be
assigned separately to the corporation and its agents. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). Such a solution is comparable to putting enforcement in the
hands of a third party. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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reasons will make no difference where proof of obstruction presupposes proof
of first-order breach. The third category of legal sanctions is penalties and
punitive damages, which, I will argue, are the only generally effective contract
remedies against obstructive breach.
A. The Right To Terminate
In some cases, it can be enough if an obstructive breach gives rise to the
right to terminate, or rescind, the agreement.45 The termination remedy is
extracompensatory, since it does not vary with or depend on the magnitude of
the obstructive harm. Where the promisor values the promisee’s continued
performance more than the potential benefit of obstructing recovery,
termination can be effective. This is confirmed by evidence from the recording
industry. Recording contracts are usually drafted by and often favor record
labels. And while they typically require royalty accounting statements and give
the artist a right to audit (duties to cooperate), they often stipulate that a
breach of those duties shall not be material.46 If one believes artists’ claims that
labels systematically underreport royalties and obstruct audits, the explanation
for the latter provision is obvious.47 A material breach gives the nonbreaching
party the right to terminate,48 and a termination remedy would deter labels
from breaching these duties to cooperate—good from the perspective of

45.

46.

47.

48.
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I will follow Farnsworth and use “terminate” (where one could also say “rescind” or
“cancel”) to refer to the nonbreaching party’s right to end the contract. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 41, § 8.15 n.2.
According to California Senator Murray, a former entertainment lawyer,
even though the obligation to accurately account for royalty earnings is a material
part of the contract, most if not all recording artist contracts provide that a breach
of the obligation to account for or pay royalties is not a material breach, leaving
the artist with no real recourse except to settle the claim on perhaps a percentage
of what is owed or else conduct protracted and expensive litigation at the possible
expense of the artist’s career.
Cal. Assem. Comm. on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media, Bill
Analysis, S. 1034, 2002-2003 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1-2 (Cal. 2003) (third reading)
(paraphrasing Sen. Murray), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_10011050/sb_1034_cfa_20030514_100846_sen_floor.html.
For the power of labels to dictate terms, and how this plays out in terms of artists’ ability to
get accurate accountings or otherwise monitor label performance, see Wendy V.
Bartholomew, Fiduciary Duty: Can It Help Calm the Fears of Underpaid Artists?, 6 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 246 (2004); and Corrina Cree Clover, Note, Accounting Accountability:
Should Record Labels Have a Fiduciary Duty To Report Accurate Royalties to Recording Artists?,
23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 395 (2003).
FARNSWORTH, supra note 41, § 8.16.
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enforcement, but bad from the point of view of the drafter and dominant party
in the transaction.
Richard Craswell provides a general description of how the right to
terminate can provide a form of property-rule protection against certain
contractual wrongs. His primary concern is how the law can prevent duress,
fraud and other acts that interfere with consent, but the basic point applies
more broadly.
One way to [deter bad acts] is to not enforce any obligation whatsoever
on behalf of any X who has failed to obtain Y’s proper consent. For
example, if X forces Y to purchase her goods at gunpoint, the court can
allow Y to rescind the contract entirely. This outcome may deter X from
using duress because it denies X any profit from her dealings with Y,
unless she properly obtains Y’s consent.49
The same holds true for obstructive breach. Where the promisor values the
continued existence of the contract more than he expects to gain from
obstructing recovery, and where the obstructive breach is likely to be detected
and demonstrated and will give the promisee the right to terminate, the
promisor will choose to cooperate in recovery. That is, a termination remedy
will be most effective where the obstructive breach is easily observed and
verified (such as refusal to permit an audit) and the promisor expects to
continue extracting value from the contract (as in long-term recording
agreements).
These conditions are not always satisfied. Most obviously, if the transaction
is a one-time deal and the promisee’s first-order performance is before the
promisor’s, the termination remedy is no disincentive against obstructive
breach. More generally, the effectiveness of the termination remedy will
depend on the contract’s remaining unrealized value to the promisor, the
likelihood that his obstructive breach will be discovered and proven, the cost of
the first-order liability he wishes to avoid, and so on. Termination is, in
Craswell’s terms, the “minimum sanction”—in some cases a “penalty heavier
than mere nonenforcement is needed.”50
There is, however, another aspect of the termination remedy that is specific
to duties to cooperate. Where the promisee has separate proof of a material
first-order breach, she might already have a right to terminate. A contract can
be cancelled only once, so in such cases a termination right for obstruction is

49.
50.

Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993).
Id. at 7-8 (emphasis omitted).
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redundant. In some cases it is much easier to show obstructive breach than it is
to show first-order breach—proof of a record company’s refusal to permit
audits as compared to proof of underpayment. But this is not always so, and
the more likely separate proof of first-order material breach, the more diluted
the effect of the right to terminate for obstruction. And because proof of
dependent obstruction always requires separate proof of first-order breach, the
termination remedy for obstructive breach is worth nothing. The catch-22
replicates itself here, now in the form of redundant remedies.
B. Adverse Inferences
If the point of obstruction is to prevent proof of first-order breach, one
obvious remedy for obstructive breach is an adverse inference. Thus the parties
might decide in advance that proof of obstructive breach shall have a certain
evidentiary value with respect to first-order breach by agreeing to a conditional
presumption, admission, or other burden-shifting device.51 Such a remedy is
extracompensatory, since it does not depend on proof of actual harm. But
rather than a monetary penalty, the deterrent is evidentiary.
At present there is little law on when or to what extent parties can contract
for atypical burdens of proof or standards of evidence that will govern the
contract’s enforcement. Probably the most informed guess is that of Scott and
Triantis, who report: “While we have not found direct authority, we believe
that courts would enforce reasonable contractual burden of proof provisions.
And, we have found ample evidence that many contracts in fact contain such
provisions.”52 All of the contracts Scott and Triantis describe, however,
unconditionally modify the otherwise applicable burden of proof or standard
of evidence. None condition the change on a party’s bad behavior, such as the
defendant’s attempt to obstruct recovery.53

51.
52.
53.
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For a description of how courts and prosecutors use adverse inferences to discourage
obstruction in the criminal context, see Sanchirico, supra note 17, at 1378-82.
Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 857-58 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 856-78
(describing decisions).
Thus Scott and Triantis identify only three ways by which the parties might
clarify, reverse, or fine-tune the default allocation in their contract. . . . The first
approach is by direct allocation of burden; the second is by predesignating whom
the plaintiff will be in the event of a dispute; and the third is by framing the
substantive provisions governing, for example, the right to assign or terminate a
contract.
Id. at 866. I am suggesting a fourth: rather than direct allocation of the burden, conditional
allocation. Scott and Triantis do describe an instance in which the court determined that a
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While there is little law in the area, courts would likely be sympathetic to
such contract terms. The party-specified remedy—a change to the way breach
is proven—is closely related to the wrong—obstruction of recovery. Moreover,
one can find analogs elsewhere in the law. For example, the rules governing the
destruction or spoliation of evidence provide for a presumption that the lost
evidence was unfavorable to the party at fault.54 Equitable principles of
estoppel might be applied to reach a similar result, the argument being that the
defendant should not be permitted to benefit from obstructive behavior.
The threat of an adverse inference will fully deter obstructive breach only
when the inference increases the probability that the promisor will pay
damages for the underlying breach more than the obstruction reduces that
probability. The former depends on two factors: first, the probability that the
promisee will be able to show an obstructive breach in circumstances where she
would not otherwise (absent the adverse inference) be able to demonstrate
first-order breach; second, the strength of the inference—whether the
obstruction is to be conclusive evidence of a first-order breach, to shift the
burden of proof, or simply to be placed on the scales with everything else. An
adverse inference is most likely to work where it is easier to detect obstructive
breach than it is first-order breach, and the inference is a strong one.
As an example, recall the hypothetical recordkeeping clause. Contractor’s
failure to keep the required records is easy to detect—much easier than
noncompliant installation. Assume that the recordkeeping clause also specifies
a strong adverse inference as its remedy: improper records shift the burden of
proof, so Contractor must show compliant installation. Finally, recall my
assumption that it is very difficult to prove breach or performance after the
wiring is installed. Faced with the prospect of an adverse inference, Contractor
may well choose to keep the required records. The benefit of hiding breach is
not worth the increased chance that he will be found liable as a result of the
adverse inference.
The reader might object that, faced with the prospect of an adverse
inference, Contractor would never breach in so obvious a way as failing to keep
records. If he wants to avoid liability for noncompliant installation, he will

54.

prima facie showing of bad faith shifted the burden of proof—though not at the behest of
the contract. Id. at 876-77 (discussing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Calvin, 353 So. 2d 144 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977)).
See generally 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 244 (1944 & Supp. 2006). The evidentiary rule
requires proof of scienter: “a conscious awareness of the existence of the dispute and that
the act done will destroy evidence or access to evidence.” Id. This is interesting in light of my
argument in Sections III.B and IV.A that scienter requirements add value to no-obstruct
duties.
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falsify the records, which is much more difficult to detect. This objection is
correct and shows why adverse inferences are at best a partial solution. But the
difference between not keeping records and keeping false records is not only a
difference in the degree of observability or verifiability of each.
An adverse inference works only if there are possible states of the world in
which (a) the promisee cannot otherwise prove the first-order breach, (b) she
can prove obstructive breach, and (c) the resulting adverse inference tips the
balance with respect to proof of the first-order breach. Conditions (a) and (b)
jointly entail that the obstructive breach is an independent one—that it is
possible to prove the obstruction without first proving first-order breach. The
adverse inference is ineffective against falsification of records not because of the
low probability of detection or proof, but because that breach of the
recordkeeping clause is a form of dependent obstruction. If Developer can
show false records, she has already proven first-order breach, and the adverse
inference makes no practical difference. The upshot is similar to the limitation
of the termination remedy: while the threat of an adverse inference can deter
some forms of independent obstruction—those that are easy to detect and
verify, and where the adverse inference is likely to result in a finding of a firstorder breach—it is ineffective against dependent obstruction.
C. Penalties and Punitive Damages: A New Argument
The only generally effective contract remedy for obstructive breach is a
penalty or punitive damages clause. To be able to contract for meaningful
duties against the full range of obstructive behavior, parties must be able to
attach either extracompensatory liquidated damages (penalties) or court- or
jury-assessed extracompensatory money payments (punitive damages) to the
breach.
How large must a penalty or punitive damages be fully to deter obstructive
breach? The answer is familiar: the lower limit is the promisor’s expected gain
from breach multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement.55
The promisor’s expected gain from obstruction is the reduced chance that he
will have to pay first-order damages. More specifically, and assuming that the
promisor has breached his first-order duties, it is the percentage-point
reduction in the probability of first-order enforcement multiplied by what
first-order liability would cost the promisor. Thus if falsifying records
decreases the probability of $10,000 in liability from eighty percent to thirty

55.

32

See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J.
421, 425-39 (1998).
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percent, the fifty percentage-point reduction in the probability of first-order
enforcement is worth $5,000 to the promisor.56 Deterrence requires the
sanction be greater than that gain multiplied by the reciprocal of the
probability that the sanction will be applied. To continue the example, if we
assume there is a twenty percent chance that the promisee will discover and be
able to prove false records, the standard punitive damage formula recommends
a sanction greater than $25,000.57
Penalties and punitive damages avoid both prongs of the catch-22. There is
no double-recovery problem in cases where the plaintiff has independent proof
of first-order breach, for penalties and punitive damages are not meant to
compensate. They therefore work equally well against independent and
dependent obstructive breach (despite the fact that proof of the latter
presupposes proof of first-order breach). Where the plaintiff cannot prove
first-order breach, and therefore cannot prove actual harm, the penalty or
punitive damages should still be awarded, as the remedy is not meant to
compensate actual loss.58
At present, however, “[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for a breach
of contract,”59 and “[a] term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.”60 The above analysis

56.
57.
58.

59.

60.

($10,000)(.5) = $5,000.
($5,000)/(.2) = $25,000.
In many jurisdictions, punitive damages may only be awarded where there is proof of actual
loss. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 197 (2002) (“As a general rule, in order to recover exemplary or
punitive damages, actual damages must be shown, or there must be a basis for the recovery
of compensatory damages.” (footnote omitted)); 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M.
WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:21 (2d ed. Supp. 2003) (“Abundant
authority exists to support the proposition that a finding must be entered entitling the
plaintiff to actual damages before that plaintiff will be allowed to recover punitive
damages.”). This rule is open to criticism. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
cmt. c (1979) (“Although . . . the extent of the harm may be considered in determining their
amount, it is not essential to the recovery of punitive damages that the plaintiff should have
suffered any harm, either pecuniary or physical.”); Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive
Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 666-67 (1980) (arguing
against the rule that punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship to actual harm). In
jurisdictions that follow the first rule, the secondary harms of obstructive breach might
satisfy the actual harm requirement. And the punitive damages in cases where there is proof
of harm can be further increased to take account of the ex ante possibility that such proof
was not going to be available.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). For developments in the law of
punitive damages for breach of contract, see William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive
Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 636-51 (1999).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981). For descriptions of practical
complexities and differences between jurisdictions, see Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger LeRoy
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provides a strong instrumentalist argument for making an exception to these
rules for contractual duties not to obstruct.61 There are good reasons to think
that, if given the option, most parties would not choose to attach penalties or
punitive damages to first-order breach. Among other things,
extracompensatory damages can interfere with efficient breach, reducing the
overall value of the transaction.62 When it comes to obstructive breach,
however, extracompensatory damages can be the only effective remedy—there
is no more efficient compensatory or subcompensatory alternative. If the
parties want duties to cooperate in recovery, they probably have a good reason
to want to attach a penalty or punitive damages to the breach of those duties.
I am not the first to recommend revising the existing mandatory rules
against penalties and punitive damages. In fact, it is perhaps the majority
opinion among efficiency theorists. But the above argument is new. To begin
with, it does not depend on a commitment either to freedom of contract (the
parties should be allowed to contract for whatever terms they wish) or to
choice as the metric of value (if the parties choose it, it must be valuecreating).63 Nor does the argument rely on empirical assumptions about the

61.

62.
63.

Miller & Timothy J. Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 WIS. L.
REV. 351, 352-57; Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q.
495, 501-13 (1962); and Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and
the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1200-05 (1994).
Not all states follow these rules. South Carolina, for example, permits punitive damages for
breach of contract accompanied by “any act characterized by dishonesty in fact, unfair
dealing, or the unlawful appropriation of another’s property by design,” a rule that might
well cover many forms of obstructive behavior. Perry v. Green, 437 S.E.2d 150, 152 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1993); see also Dodge, supra note 59, at 649-50 (describing similar rules in Idaho,
Mississippi, and New Mexico). It is unclear whether the courts in these states treat such
punitive damages as mandatory remedies or as defaults the parties could opt out of, much
less whether courts would permit the parties to specify the bad acts that should trigger
them.
See infra text accompanying notes 123-128.
The argument from freedom of contract is suggested by Daniel Friedmann in The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1989). Samuel Rea describes the difficulty the choice
metric poses for economic explanations of the rule against penalties:
The perplexing aspect of the penalties-liquidated damages distinction is that there
is a conflict between the apparent, but express, intention of the parties and the
subsequent action of the courts.
Economists are inclined to believe that courts are contributing to inefficiency
when they upset the agreed upon terms of a contract.
Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 147, 148 (1984); see also Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289
(7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he parties (always assuming they are fully competent) will,
in deciding whether to include a penalty clause in their contract, weigh the gains against the
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capacity of the courts to distinguish penalties from reasonable estimates of
harm.64 Finally, the argument does not correspond to any of the transaction
structures (all involving informational asymmetries or verification problems)
in which extracompensatory damages have been shown to create efficient
investment incentives for first-order duties.65 Rather than identifying a
category of transactions where extracompensatory measures are more efficient,
the argument identifies a category of terms for which legal liability does not
work unless the parties can choose penalties or punitive damages.
There is also a practical difference. The basic insight behind the economic
argument dates back at least to 1977.66 Yet in the thirty years since, it has had
little or no influence on lawmakers. The mandatory rules against penalties and
punitive damages appear as vibrant today as ever.67 The explanation might be

64.

65.
66.
67.

costs . . . and will include the clause only if the benefits exceed those costs . . . .”); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554,
555 n.12 (1977) (describing how the penalty doctrine is “anomalous in terms of the
theoretical underpinnings of modern contract law”).
Thus Alan Schwartz argues:
Courts do not have to prevent promisees from obtaining penalty clauses if
promisees do not want penalty clauses. The ex ante rule is not merely
unnecessary: judicial review produces mischief. Courts sometimes mistake
compensatory damage measures for penalties, and so have found that particular
liquidated damage clauses would inevitably overcompensate promisees when
those clauses only protected the expectation. Thus, the ex ante branch of the
liquidated damage rule should be abandoned.
Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supercompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of
Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 370 (1990); see also Goetz & Scott, supra
note 63, at 578-93 (arguing that many penalty clauses are designed to compensate for
damages or create efficient incentives that remain inscrutable to courts); Schwartz, supra, at
383-87.
These developments are described in Edlin & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 43-52.
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 63, at 554.
See, e.g., Klinger v. Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1034 (Colo. 2006) (“[A]
contract provision for liquidated damages is invalid as a penalty if it is unreasonably large
for the expected loss from a breach of contract.”); Bragdon v. Twenty-Five Twelve Assocs.
P’ship, 856 A.2d 1165, 1173 (D.C. 2004) (“Punitive damages will not lie for breach of
contract, even if it is proven that the breach was willful, wanton, or malicious.”); Dist.
Cablevision P’ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 724 (D.C. 2003) (“Agreements to pay fixed sums
plainly without reasonable relation to any probable damage which may follow a breach will
not be enforced.”); TAL Fin. Corp. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (Mass.
2006)(“[L]iquidated damages will not be enforced if the sum is ‘grossly disproportionate to
a reasonable estimate of actual damages’ made at the time of contract formation.” (quoting
Kelley v. Marx, 705 N.E. 2d 1114, 1116 (Mass. 1999)); Ins. Co. of the W. v. Gibson Tile Co.,
134 P.3d 698, 703 (Nev. 2006) (“[T]he award of punitive damages cannot be based upon a
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that courts and legislatures pay too little attention to efficiency. Or perhaps
there are other, noneconomic reasons for keeping the rules. Either way, it
should be easier to convince courts to take a smaller step. Contractual duties to
create, preserve, or share information so as to promote recovery for first-order
breach constitute a well-defined, limited class of terms, where the reasons for
allowing extracompensatory remedies are easy to grasp and where penalties or
punitive damages do not threaten more general intuitions about the proper
limits of contractual liability. Presented with the right arguments, courts might
be willing to enforce a penalty or punitive damages clause for obstructive
breach.
iii. contracting for fraud liability
In the absence of effective contract remedies, legal actors have had to look
elsewhere to secure cooperation in recovery. The first two Parts of this Article
have provided an armchair analysis of why parties might want no-obstruct
terms (when they are the cheapest way of addressing underenforcement) and
how such terms can be effective (when backed by extracompensatory remedies
that avoid the catch-22 of proving actual harm). This Part takes an empirical
turn and describes how courts and parties have attempted to secure such duties
in the face of the rules against penalties and punitive damages. In the absence
of a contractual solution, they have turned to the extracompensatory remedies
available in tort.
The most striking and potentially powerful approach lies in attempts to
piggyback on the punitive damages available in fraud by contracting for
representations about performance. I have already mentioned two examples:
the Richmond stadium construction contract, which required the builder to
certify that work was done to specification, and the Alabama oil and gas royalty
contracts, which required Exxon to submit royalty reports. In both cases,
compensatory damages for the obstructive breach (false certificates of
compliance or false royalty statements) provided insufficient protection against
obstructive breach as a result of the now familiar catch-22. And in each, the
plaintiff invoked the law of fraud as an additional source of legal liability, albeit
with varying degrees of success.
The potential value of fraud liability in these transactions shows that
contract duties to represent performance are not just a place where fraud and

cause of action sounding solely in contract.”); Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 84
P.3d 1154, 1161 (Utah 2003) (“[P]unitive damages are recoverable only for torts, not for
breach of contract.”).
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contract happen to overlap. Fraud liability for the breach of such terms can play
a positive role within the contracting relationship. This parallels a claim Ian
Ayres and I have made about the utility of fraud liability for precontractual
misrepresentations of intent.68 But there is also something new here. While
there has been a fair amount of academic discussion as to whether, when, and
how parties should be permitted to contract out of liability for fraud,69 my
analysis indicates that some parties are trying to contract into fraud liability.
Parties appear to be using the law of fraud to get the extracompensatory
remedies for obstruction that contract law denies them. The existence of these
terms is evidence that effective duties to cooperate are not only useful in
theory, but sought-after in practice. But this salutary use of fraud faces its own
doctrinal obstacles, most recently in the form of an expansive reading of the
economic loss rule. Perhaps held captive by the theory of efficient breach,
courts have overlooked this positive role fraud liability can play in contracting
relationships.
Fraud liability for misrepresentations about performance is not the only
way the punitive damages available in tort can be used to enforce contractual
duties to cooperate.70 Before examining the fraud option, I discuss California’s
brief experiment with punitive tort damages for obstruction of recovery, first
announced in 1984 in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.71
While Seaman’s is most often criticized as an example of the generic tort of bad
faith breach, attention to the holding shows that it rightly singled out
obstructive behavior for penalization. The real problem with Seaman’s is not
that it imported tort liability into the land of contract. The problem is its vague
yet mandatory rule that punitive damages should be available for all postbreach
obstruction, rather than a rule permitting parties to contract into or out of such
remedies and also specify the relevant duty.
I then describe how fraud liability for misrepresentations about
performance can correct for this defect, though many courts frown on this

68.
69.
70.

71.

AYRES & KLASS, supra note 6.
See supra note 5.
The three techniques I discuss are not the only ones available. Recording artists have tried
and generally failed to impose on recording companies a fiduciary duty to account for
royalty payments. See S. 1034, 2002-2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). Like fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty can permit the recovery of punitive damages, effectively deterring obstructive
behavior. A downside of fiduciary duties as compared to fraud liability is their lack of
specificity. Rather than the relatively clear duty to be honest, there is a relatively amorphous
duty of loyalty. See Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations
of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 934-40 (2006); D. Gordon Smith,
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1406-11 (2002).
686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984).
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intrusion of fraud into contractual relationships. Yet a third technique for
preventing obstruction uses the law of promissory fraud. Representations of
intent not to obstruct, backed by the law of fraud, can provide a promisee some
assurance that the promisor will cooperate in recovery. In the last Section of
this Part, I argue that fraud liability, while potentially effective in securing
some duties to cooperate in recovery, is a second-best solution.
A. An Early Foray: Rereading Seaman’s Direct Buying Services v. Standard
Oil
The analysis of Parts I and II sheds new light on California’s brief
experiment with the tort of postbreach bad faith behavior. In 1984, the
California Supreme Court held in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil
Co. that “a party to a contract may incur tort remedies [“including punitive
damages”] when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself
from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the
contract exists.”72 That is, certain postbreach denials of the contract were
grounds for punitive damages in tort. Seaman’s sowed a fair amount of
confusion in the lower courts, which arrived at a variety of standards for
determining when a defendant’s behavior was so wrongful as to constitute the
tort.73 Eleven years later, the California Supreme Court, citing inter alia the
greater efficiency of compensatory measures, expressly overruled Seaman’s and
abandoned the experiment.74
Seaman’s is often criticized as an example of the tortification of bad faith
breach in general. This expansive reading is partly attributable to the case’s
procedural history. The plaintiff had asked the court to recognize the broader
tort of bad faith breach, extending the rule from the insurance context to all
commercial claims. And the majority left open the possibility of recognizing
such a tort in a later case, with Chief Justice Bird arguing in a partial

72.
73.

74.
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Id.
For surveys of the variety of lower-court interpretations of Seaman’s, see, for example,
Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995); Landsdorf, supra note
35, at 222-35. The furthest extension of Seaman’s by the lower courts appears to have been in
Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct. App. 1986), which “extend[ed] Seaman’s to
bad faith attempt to deprive employee of contractual benefits.” Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at
675.
Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 676-77. Dodge argues that the real turning point was as early
as 1988, when the California Supreme Court declined to extend Seaman’s to employment
contracts. Dodge, supra note 59, at 642 (discussing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373 (Cal. 1988)).
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concurrence that “[a] breach of contract may also constitute a tortious breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a situation where the
possibility that the contract will be breached is not accepted or reasonably
expected by the parties.”75 Commentators therefore read Seaman’s as
representing more than it said—as putting California on the road to a general
tort of bad faith breach.76 That reading was amplified by the fact that contort
was in the air in the mid-1980s, and by the perceived need to repel assaults on
freedom of contract.77 Judge Kozinski expressed the common reading and
wisdom as follows:
Nowhere but in the Cloud Cuckooland of modern tort theory could a
case like this have been concocted. One large corporation is
complaining that another obstinately refused to acknowledge they had
a contract. For this shocking misconduct it is demanding millions of
dollars in punitive damages. I suppose we will next be seeing lawsuits
seeking punitive damages for maliciously refusing to return telephone
calls or adopting a condescending tone in interoffice memos. Not every
slight, nor even every wrong, ought to have a tort remedy. The
intrusion of courts into every aspect of life, and particularly into every
type of business relationship, generates serious costs and uncertainties,
trivializes the law, and denies individuals and businesses the autonomy
of adjusting mutual rights and responsibilities through voluntary
contractual agreement.78
But whether or not Seaman’s was part of a larger trend, what it said was
relatively narrow: tort damages are appropriate where “a contracting party
seek[s] to avoid all liability on a meritorious contract claim by adopting a
‘stonewall’ position (‘see you in court’) without probable cause and with no
belief in the existence of a defense.”79 Stonewalling of this sort is, in my terms,

75.
76.

77.

78.
79.

686 P.2d at 1167; id. at 1174 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 59, at 638 n.33; E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract
Law During the 1980’s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 205 (1990); Friedmann,
supra note 63, at 19 n.62; Curtis Bridgeman, Note, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There
a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237, 270-71 (2003). But see Shiffrin, supra note
10, at 723 n.27 (recognizing the limited scope of Seaman’s).
See, e.g., John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon
Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565, 1600-54
(1986).
Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
686 P.2d at 1167.
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obstruction of recovery. Read narrowly, the Seaman’s rule does not impose a
Cloud Cuckooland generic duty of good manners, but is supported by many of
the above arguments for permitting the parties to adopt extracompensatory
remedies for obstructive breach. Thus court-assessed compensatory damages
alone neither insure against nor deter the sort of stonewalling at issue in
Seaman’s. Punitive damages or other extracompensatory remedies are
necessary.80 Moreover, where there is a measure of distrust and uncertainty at
the outset of a deal, the parties themselves might rationally prefer Seaman’s
protection. A promisee who knows that the promisor faces a significant
deterrent against unreasonably denying the existence of the contract knows she
is more likely to recover in the case of nonperformance, and will therefore be
more willing to enter into the transaction. Finally, Kozinski is simply wrong
when he writes that Seaman’s “denies individuals and businesses the autonomy
of adjusting mutual rights and responsibilities through voluntary contractual
agreement.”81 Parts I and II have shown that the rules against penalties and
punitive damages already deny parties the ability to contract for meaningful
duties to cooperate in recovery. Seaman’s simply flipped the rule. Where before
there was never meaningful legal liability for postbreach obstruction, Seaman’s
held that such behavior should always be subject to punitive liability in tort.
This does not mean that California should have kept the Seaman’s rule,
which suffered from serious defects. The experience of lower courts shows that
Seaman’s failed to define the wrong with sufficient precision.82 The predictable
result of the duty’s vague definition was that the threat of punitive damages
deterred defendants from raising legitimate defenses and caused plaintiffs to

80.

81.
82.
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Michael Dorff is therefore wrong when, criticizing the application of punitive damages in
Seaman’s, he states that “the consequences of denying the contract’s existence would be
virtually identical to the consequences of any other complete contract breach, and the parties
would be expected to negotiate about the risks of a complete breach.” Michael Dorff,
Attaching Tort Claims to Contract Actions: An Economic Analysis of Contort, 28 SETON HALL L.
REV. 390, 423 (1997).
Oki Am., 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
See supra note 73. Kozinski correctly diagnosed this problem:
[Seaman’s] created a cause of action so nebulous in outline and so unpredictable
in application that it more resembles a brick thrown from a third story window
than a rule of law. Seaman’s gives nary a hint as to how to distinguish a bad faith
denial that a contract exists, from a dispute over contract terms, from a
permissible attempt to rescind a contract, or from a loosely worded disclaimer of
continued contractual responsibility.
Oki Am., 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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overlitigate minor claims in the hopes of big payoffs.83 The California Supreme
Court might have tried to fix this problem by clarifying the definition of
“stonewalling” and by limiting it to highly verifiable behavior, so as to exclude
both discretion and false positives. But replacing the “in bad faith and without
probable cause” standard with a narrower test would have robbed the Seaman’s
rule of much of its utility. Because postbreach obstruction comes in endless
varieties, generic narrow rules will invite circumvention and have limited
effect.84
These difficulties result from a deeper problem with the Seaman’s
approach: the court’s attempt to address obstruction of recovery by creating a
new tort rather than by modifying the law of contracts. Because tort law
provides one-size-fits-all solutions, the Seaman’s court had to rely on its own
understanding of “accepted notions of business ethics,”85 ignoring the
industry- and context-dependence of such norms. More generally, why should
courts attempt to fashion generic no-obstruct rules when the parties, if given
the tools, can generate rules to fit their particular needs and circumstances?86
Rather than the one-size-fits-all rules of tort law, the better approach lies
within the contractual framework. The parties to a transaction know best what
duties will increase the probability of enforcement. If they want to prohibit
stonewalling or other forms of obstruction, let them specify both the relevant
duty and the remedy for its breach.
B. Contracting for Fraud Liability
There is one species of tort liability and extracompensatory remedy that
contracting parties might easily opt into: liability for fraud. A speaker exposes

83.

84.
85.
86.

See Oki Am., 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Seaman’s throws kerosene on the
litigation bonfire by holding out the allure of punitive damages, a golden carrot that entices
into court parties who might otherwise be inclined to resolve their differences.”); Lynch &
Freytag v. Cooper, 267 Cal. Rptr. 189, 195-96 (Ct. App. 1990) (suggesting that minor
contract action was litigated overzealously due to the “allure of punitive damages”).
Cf. Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1988-92 (2006)
(collecting examples of similar observations about the law of fraud).
686 P.2d at 1167.
In fact, Seaman’s recognized the parties’ ability “to shape the contours of their agreement
and to include provisions for attorney fees and liquidated damages in the event of
breach. . . . [T]hey are free, within reasonable limits at least, to agree upon the standards by
which application of the covenant [of good faith] is to be measured.” 686 P.2d at 1167.
While allowing that the availability of party choice counseled caution in applying tort
remedies in the contract setting, the court did not discuss whether parties might opt-out of
or contractually modify the Seaman’s tort.
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himself to fraud liability when he makes material representations on which the
listener is likely reasonably to rely. If the parties can contract for such
representations, they potentially can secure for themselves extracompensatory
remedies for obstructive breach by way of the law of fraud. The idea is to tailor
informational duties not to obstruct so that their nonperformance qualifies not
only as breach, but also as deceit. The most obvious example is a requirement
that the promisor say whether he has breached. A duty to inform about
performance, if backed by the law of fraud, gives the promisor in first-order
breach three options: honestly inform the promisee of nonperformance;
decline to make the representation, breaching the no-obstruct duty and
effectively communicating to the promisee that there may be a first-order
breach; or falsely represent that he has performed, exposing himself to punitive
damages for fraud. Timely information about performance is secured by the
extracompensatory remedies available for misrepresentation.
In fact, piggybacking on the law of fraud has a potential advantage over
liability in contract. While contracts are governed by principles of strict
liability, liability for fraud requires proof of scienter—that the
misrepresentation was intentional or reckless.87 This protects promisors
against large punitive damage awards for small mistakes in complying with
their no-obstruct duties. The scienter requirement also provides some measure
of assurance against false allegations of obstructive breach, since the promisee
not only has to show nonperformance, but also intent or recklessness.88
While it is difficult to say from the outside exactly why contracts have the
terms they do, there is evidence that parties attempt to use this strategy.
Consider Alabama’s gas and oil leases with Exxon, which required that Exxon
represent that its royalty payments complied with the contract. The jury
determined that Exxon both underpaid and intentionally misrepresented the
basis for the payments. The trial court held that the first breach warranted
compensatory damages, while the second supported punitive damages in
fraud.89 In Holmesian terms, Exxon had the right to breach and pay damages,
but not to lie about it in contractually required representations.
This sort of fraud claim is perhaps most common in royalty disputes, but is
not limited to them.90 The city of Richmond’s fraud claim against the

87.
88.

89.
90.
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W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984).
See, e.g., Morrill v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 747 F.2d 1217, 1222 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding
that evidence was insufficient to establish requisite scienter for some claimed
misrepresentations as to sales figures connected to royalty payments).
Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 1, 20-25, 62.
See, e.g., Morrill, 747 F.2d at 1220 (false royalty statements to inventor); Gregory v. Chem.
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 598 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) (false waste-disposal facility
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contractor in McDevitt was based on false certificates of completion and other
required documents.91 In Life Insurance Co. v. Murray Investment Co., the
purchaser of real estate notes claimed fraud based on contractually required
quarterly reports that misrepresented progress on a construction project.92 And
in Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., a helicopter maker sued a supplier for
fraud based on required certificates of compliance that falsely represented that
parts met contractual specifications.93 Robinson Helicopter in particular repays
close study: while the facts and holding demonstrate the potential utility of
fraud liability for obstructive breach, the opinions in the case illustrate the
doctrinal hurdles this salutary use of tort liability faces.
Robinson Helicopter began purchasing clutch mechanisms from Dana
Corporation for use in its helicopters in 1984.94 Robinson’s purchase orders
required that shipments be accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance, which
stated that the clutches met contractual specifications.95 Dana regularly
included the certificates, though clutches shipped between July 1996 and
October 1997 were noncompliant. High failure rates resulted in the discovery
of Dana’s first-order breach, and Robinson sued for breach of contract, breach
of warranty, and negligent and intentional misrepresentation. The California
Supreme Court upheld the jury award of $1.5 million in compensatory
damages for the breach of contract and warranty, and an additional $6 million
in punitive damages, the latter based on the jury’s finding that in providing the
certificates, Dana had made false representations of fact and had knowingly
misrepresented or concealed material facts with the intent to defraud.96
From the perspective of this Article, this was the right outcome. The
certificates of compliance apparently corrected for two worries Robinson had
going into the transaction. The first was the difficulty of observing certain sorts
of breach. At issue in the case was the metallurgical integrity of the clutches,

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

royalty statements); Reis v. Peabody Coal Co., 997 S.W.2d 49, 68, 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)
(false royalty statements and misrepresentations as to compliance with most-favored-nation
clause); Apple Records, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 137 A.D.2d 50, 56 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988) (false royalty statements in recording contract); Oestreicher v. Am. Nat’l Stores, Inc.,
225 S.E.2d 797 (N.C. 1976) (false royalty sales statements); Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas
Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1997) (false oil royalty statements). For another nonroyalty
case, see Krantz v. Chateau Stores of Canada Ltd., 683 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 1998) (false
statement of annual profits used as basis for bonus).
Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt St. Bovis, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 344 (Va. 1998).
646 F.2d 224, 225-27 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981).
102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004).
Id. at 271.
See Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 686 n.6 (Ct. App. 2003).
Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 274-75.
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which was presumably difficult or expensive to detect. Second, if such a breach
was not discovered early, Robinson would likely suffer significant
noncompensable damages. Systematic clutch failures would result not only in
possibly catastrophic liability, but also regulatory noncompliance, loss of
reputation, and other nonrecoverables. Robinson might have attempted to
capture some of these first-order harms in a liquidated damages clause. But
there was the risk that a court would view the high liquidated damages amount
as a penalty and therefore unenforceable. The parties therefore constructed a
contract that permitted Dana the usual option of breaching and paying
unliquidated compensatory damages, but effectively required that it
immediately inform Robinson of such breach—by not sending the clutches or
by not including the Certificate of Compliance. This no-obstruct duty to share
information about performance was structured such that any injurious breach
would involve misrepresentation. In this way, the parties were able to attach
extracompensatory damages, by way of liability for fraud, to the most salient
form of obstruction.
One can imagine other ways to structure a contract so as to secure
cooperation in recovery via fraud liability. Recall the hypothetical reporting
clause. Unlike the Robinson-Dana contract, in which performance was
episodic, the imagined contract between Developer and Contractor envisions a
continuous period of performance.97 Rather than arbitrarily chosen daily,
weekly, or monthly performance reports (“I am not in breach”), Developer
might prefer that Contractor be required immediately to report any breach (“I
have breached”), where failure to report would expose Contractor to liability
for fraudulent concealment.98 The reporting clause is cheaper than the
certificate of compliance requirement in Robinson Helicopter. Instead of regular
reports of compliance, there is at most one communication, and that only in
the case of breach. This means cost savings both in the number of reports and
in their value: a contemporaneous report of breach conveys to the promisor
just the information she needs at the moment she needs it most. As a doctrinal
matter, however, recovery for fraud might be more difficult under the
reporting clause. While the false certificates of compliance at issue in Robinson
Helicopter involved garden-variety misrepresentations (Dana said it performed
when it had not), breach of the reporting clause qualifies as fraud only under a
theory of fraudulent concealment. It appears to be an open question whether,

97.
98.
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For an even better example, see the discussion of the RIO and RIO2 contracts in the
Conclusion.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1997).
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as a doctrinal matter, fraud by silence applies when the duty to speak is purely
contractual.99
There is, however, a larger obstacle to the whole project of incorporating
fraud liability with contractual duties to represent: the tendency of courts to
exclude tort liability from contractual relationships. The strong pull in this
direction is exemplified by the various opinions in Robinson Helicopter and their
uniformly expansive reading of the economic loss rule. Given that the
American Law Institute is undertaking a revision of the Restatement’s
treatment of that rule, this reading deserves scrutiny.100
The economic loss rule “precludes a recovery in tort where the sale of a
defective product has resulted in no property damage or bodily injury, but only
economic loss to the buyer of that product.”101 The doctrine first emerged in
the mid-1960s as a means of drawing the line between, on the one hand,
breach of warranty and, on the other, strict product liability and negligence.102
The first articulations of the rule held that so long as a defect did not cause the
purchaser physical injury or property damage, she could recover only in
contract—only for breach of warranty. Early cases did not decide whether the
doctrine extended to intentional torts.
In the past decade, several courts have held that the economic loss rule bars
liability in fraud between contracting parties except for “acts considered to be

99.

100.
101.
102.

I have been able to locate only one case applying fraudulent suppression based on a
contractual duty to disclose. Gregory v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 598
(W.D. Tenn. 1996), held that there was a duty to disclose where the contract warranted that
the defendant’s representations “do not and will not include any untrue statement of
material fact or fail to include any material fact, all to the end that such statements are not
misleading.” Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted). The court concluded that the defendant
breached the resultant duty to disclose when it did not reveal a change in its manner of
calculating royalty payments. Id. The fraud claim in that case, however, was also supported
by affirmative misrepresentations in the royalty statements. Id. at 611-12. The reason there
are not more examples of fraudulent concealment based on contractual duties to disclose is
not difficult to discern: the vast majority of cases and commentary on fraud by silence
concern fraud in the inducement, before a contract exists. See, e.g., 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and
Deceit § 204 (2006); Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of
Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 329 (1991).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ECONOMIC TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 8 (Preliminary
Draft No. 2, 2006).
Robinson Helicopter, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684.
As Justice Traynor explained in the seminal case, “[t]he history of the doctrine of strict
liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of
the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem
of physical injuries.” Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965) (Traynor,
C.J.).
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independent from acts that breached the contract.”103 Courts define
“independent” in different ways. Many, including the intermediate appellate
court in Robinson Helicopter, pay particular attention to whether the
misrepresentation occurred before or after formation—to the distinction
“between fraud in the inducement of the contract, which is not barred by the
economic loss rule, and fraudulent misrepresentations relating to the
performance of the contract, which are barred.”104 Fraud in the inducement,
these courts reason, cannot interfere with contractually chosen risk allocation.
When fraud in the inducement occurs, the contract does not yet exist, and
fraudulent inducement means that the promisee’s agreement to the contractual
allocation of risk is not truly voluntary.105 Misrepresentations in the course of
performance, on the other hand, are understood to be “interwoven with the
breach of contract,”106 so liability for fraud in the performance should be
governed exclusively by the contractual allocation of risk.
This expansive reading of the economic loss rule prevents the use of
liability in fraud to secure information-sharing duties that promote recovery.
The relevant misrepresentations in these cases are necessarily “interwoven”
with the breach, for the contract requires the promisor to make them
truthfully. For example, the intermediate court in Robinson Helicopter
concluded that Robinson “has neither claimed nor established any fraudulent

103.

104.

105.
106.
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HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996). The
leading case adopting this approach is Huron Tool & Engineering Co. v. Precision Consulting
Services, Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541, 544-45 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). See also Dinsmore Instrument
Co. v. Bombardier, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 968, 971-72 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Valleyside Dairy
Farms, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 944 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Kaloti
Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 699 N.W.2d 205, 219-21 (Wis. 2005). For academic
discussions, see Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Consumers:
Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 829 (2006); Steven C. Tourek, Thomas H. Byrd & Charles J. Schoenwetter, Bucking
the “Trend”: The Uniform Commercial Code, the Economic Loss Doctrine, and Common Law
Causes of Action for Fraud and Misrepresentation, 84 IOWA L. REV. 875 (1999); R. Joseph
Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and
Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789 (2000).
129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695; see Tourek et al., supra note 103, at 895-912; Barton, supra note 103,
at 1802-12. Some courts have taken the further step of applying the economic loss rule to
“foreclose tort claims against the defendant who fraudulently induces the contract by
representations about the character and quality of the goods or services sold.” Dan B.
Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 729
(2006).
See, e.g., Robinson Helicopter, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697.
Huron Tool, 532 N.W.2d at 545.
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representation or concealment that was not intertwined with Dana’s
performance of its contract and warranty breaches.”107
The California Supreme Court rejected that holding, stating without
further explanation that “the economic loss rule does not bar Robinson’s fraud
and intentional misrepresentation claims because they were independent of
Dana’s breach of contract.”108 The court avoided a broad ruling on whether or
when the economic loss rule applies to fraud in the performance by limiting its
holding “to a defendant’s affirmative misrepresentations on which a plaintiff
relies and which expose a plaintiff to liability for personal damages independent of the
plaintiff’s economic loss.”109 While less than crystalline, this statement suggests
that the California Supreme Court agrees that the economic loss rule bars
recovery for most fraud in the performance, or fraud that is intertwined with
the breach.
There is considerable irony in applying the economic loss rule to defeat
fraud liability in cases like Robinson Helicopter. One of the most commonly cited
reasons for excluding tort liability from contractual relationships is that it
interferes with the parties’ chosen allocation of risk. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has explained:
The commercial buyer and commercial seller can negotiate a contract—
a warranty—that will set the terms of compensation for product failure.
If the buyer obtains a warranty, he will receive compensation for the
product’s loss, whether the product explodes or just refuses to start. If
the buyer does not obtain a warranty, he will likely receive a lower price
in return. Given the availability of warranties, the courts should not ask
tort law to perform a job that contract law might perform better.110

107.

108.
109.

110.

129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697; see also Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 510
(S.D. 1997) (Amundson, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that there is no fraud liability
where the contract “impliedly create[d] the obligation to make true factual
representations”). But see Grynberg, 573 N.W.2d at 501 (majority opinion) (holding that false
royalty statements, though required by contract, violated a separate obligation to refrain
from invading the property of others by fraud).
Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 274-75.
Id. at 276 (emphasis added). Other factors emphasized by the California Supreme Court
likely to distinguish Robinson Helicopter from future cases include the impact of Dana’s
breach on public safety and the fact that the improper clutches put Robinson out of
compliance with FAA regulations. See id. at 274 n.7.
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 880 (1997); see also, e.g., Clark v.
Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Mass. 1998) (“When the economic loss rule has been applied,
the parties usually were in a position to bargain freely concerning the allocation of risk
. . . .”); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J. 1985)
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This rationale makes sense when the tort at issue is negligence or product
liability, both of which typically provide compensatory damages only. But it
makes no sense when the wrong is fraud. The parties in Robinson Helicopter
could not have accomplished with contract liability what they got with liability
in fraud—extracompensatory damages for obstructive breach. Applying the
economic loss rule in this context does not protect the parties’ chosen allocation
of risk, but defeats it.111
Despite its defects, California’s potentially expansive reading of the
economic loss rule agrees with the approaches of several other jurisdictions,
including Michigan, Florida, and Wisconsin.112 Nor is the economic loss rule
the only bar to fraud liability between contracting parties.113 In McDevitt, the

111.

112.

113.
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(“Contract principles . . . are generally more appropriate for determining claims for
consequential damage that the parties have, or could have, addressed in their agreement.”);
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 2003) (“Whether the doctrine is
asserted in terms of economic loss or independent duty, the underlying reasoning remains
the same: tort law should govern the duties and liabilities imposed by legislatures and
courts upon non-consenting members of society, and contract law should govern the
bargained-for duties and liabilities of persons who exercise freedom of contract.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ECONOMIC TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 8 cmt. b (Preliminary
Draft No. 2, 2006) (noting that rationales for the economic loss rule include
“[e]ncourag[ing] private ordering” and “preserving the priority of contract law”).
The above analysis is significantly different from other arguments for excluding fraud from
the economic loss rule. For instance, Tourek, Boyd, and Schoenwetter maintain that the rule
should not apply to fraud because, among other things, “[a]s a practical matter, it is difficult
to see how a party can effectively anticipate and therefore negotiate the allocation of risks for
every type of misrepresentation and every form of deceit that may be perpetrated by the
other party to an agreement.” Tourek et al., supra note 103, at 916; see also Stoughton
Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (“A party to a
contract cannot rationally calculate the possibility that the other party will deliberately
misrepresent terms critical to that contract.”); Dobbs, supra note 104, at 731 (“Where the
parties have not agreed to subject a given risk or dispute to the contract’s terms, to apply the
economic loss rule is not to honor the contract but rather to impose a contract limitation
where none was intended . . . .”). My argument is exactly the opposite: when it comes to
contractually required representations, the parties might anticipate and prefer allocating the
risk of misrepresentation in accordance with the law of fraud, but the expansive reading of
the economic loss rule prevents them from doing so.
See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996); Huron Tool
& Eng’g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995);
Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 699 N.W.2d 205 (Wis. 2005); see also AKA Distrib.
Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 137 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Minnesota law); Cooper
Power Sys., Inc. v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 123 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1997)
(applying Wisconsin law).
For a summary overview, see Dorff, supra note 80, at 407-11. For other examples of how
these doctrines have been applied to concealment of breach cases, see Catherine Paskoff
Chang, Note, Two Wrongs Can Make Two Rights: Why Courts Should Allow Tortious Recovery
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Virginia Supreme Court ruled that “[i]n determining whether a cause of action
sounds in contract or tort, the source of the duty violated must be ascertained,”
where a noncontractual source means no fraud liability.114 The Nebraska
Supreme Court has required that a fraud plaintiff allege “separate and distinct
factual occurrences that could stand alone as a separate cause of action
sounding in tort.”115 And Ohio courts have held that
[i]n addition to containing a duty independent of that created by
contract, an action arising out of contract which is also based upon
tortious conduct must include actual damages attributable to the
wrongful acts of the alleged tortfeasor which are in addition to those
attributable to the breach of the contract.116
Each of these rules prevents the parties from using the law of fraud to contract
for effective duties to cooperate in recovery. All are misguided according to this
Article’s analysis.

114.

115.
116.

for Intentional Concealment of Contract Breach, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 47, 66-72
(2005).
Not all courts exclude liability from the contract setting. See, e.g., Morrill v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 747 F.2d 1217, 1222 (8th Cir. 1984) (“[U]nder Missouri law, liability in tort
may co-exist with liability in contract arising out of the same events.”); Life Ins. Co. v.
Murray Inv. Co., 646 F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (“[U]nder Texas law, if the
act complained of constitutes both a breach of contract and a willful tort, exemplary
damages are recoverable.”). And the tendency to exclude tort is of relatively recent origin.
See WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED TOPICS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 380 (1954). Prosser himself was in favor of a broad overlap between tort
and contract: “When the ghosts of case and assumpsit walk hand in hand at midnight, it is
sometimes a convenient and comforting thing to have a borderland in which they may lose
themselves.” Id. at 452.
507 S.E.2d at 347; see also Americana Petroleum Corp. v. Northville Indus. Corp., 606
N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (App. Div. 1994) (“[I]n order to state a cause of action sounding in
fraud, the plaintiff must allege a breach of duty which is collateral or extraneous to the
contract between the parties.”).
Cimino v. FirsTier Bank, 530 N.W.2d 606, 613 (Neb. 1995).
Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 1261, 1271 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996) (emphasis omitted); see also Chachere v. Drake, 941 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Tex. App. 1996)
(“The mere availability of a tort-based theory of recovery is not sufficient; actual damages
sustained from an independent tort must be proven before punitive damages are
available.”).
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C. Promissory Representations of No Intent To Obstruct
There is another way a promisor might use fraud liability to assure the
promisee that he will not obstruct recovery: by making a legally backed
representation of intent not to obstruct. While precontractual representations
of intent do not provide the assurance of a postformation representation of
performance, they are of theoretical interest and can make a difference at the
margins.
The doctrine of promissory fraud interprets every contractual promise as
representing that the promisor intends to perform and imposes liability for
fraud where that representation is false—that is, where the promise is made
without an intent to perform. Punitive damages for promissory fraud add value
to contracting relationships.117 Where damages for breach are systematically
subcompensatory, a promisor who intends to perform wants a credible means
of sharing that information. A representation of intent to perform, backed by
the law of fraud, gives it to him.
By the same token, if standard breach of contract damages cannot protect
against obstruction (not because they are subcompensatory, but because the
proof structure of proximate harm renders them largely irrelevant), perhaps
credible representations of intent not to obstruct can. A promisee who is
worried about obstruction presumably believes first-order breach is a real
possibility—even if the promisor presently intends to perform. To convince the
promisee that she will be able to recover, the promisor might represent not
only that he intends to perform, but also that he intends to cooperate in
recovery (by adequate recordkeeping, by informing her of breach, etc.) should
the first intent fail. Such a representation can, if credible, assure the promisee
that she will recover for any first-order breach. The law lends credibility to
such representations of intent not to obstruct by imposing fraud liability when
they are false.
Because the doctrine of promissory fraud holds that every promise
represents an intent to perform, a promisor’s agreement to a no-obstruct term
represents that he intends not to engage in that form of obstruction—and
should bring with it the added benefit of promissory fraud protection. Thus
the Dixie Chicks recently alleged that Sony Music not only breached its
contractual duty to “permit them to conduct meaningful audits to ascertain the
accuracy of its accountings,” but entered the contract intending that obstructive

117.
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AYRES & KLASS, supra note 6, at 59-82.
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breach.118 It is unclear what evidence the Dixie Chicks had to back up that
claim, which was dismissed early in the litigation,119 but one can imagine cases
where a plaintiff could make the showing and recover punitive damages for the
misrepresentation of an intent to cooperate.
There are, therefore, two ways to represent an intent not to obstruct
recovery backed by the law of fraud: expressly (“I intend to keep such-andsuch records.”), and implicitly, as part of a promise not to obstruct (“Party A
shall keep such-and-such records.”). Yet a third way would exist if courts
adopted an interpretive rule that, absent evidence to the contrary, every firstorder promise represents not only an intent to perform, but also an intent to
cooperate in recovery. That is, the law might stipulate that among the default
representations embedded in a legally binding promise is a representation that
the promisor does not intend to obstruct recovery should he fail to perform.
This default makes sense given the law’s general interest in the effectiveness of
legal remedies. A generic default, however, might have Seaman’s-like bad
consequences. Seaman’s imposed a duty so amorphous that parties did not
know what was required of them. At the very least, one would want the
content of the default representation of intent to cooperate spelled out in detail,
with a clear and predictable definition of what counts as obstruction, so
promisors know just what they are representing their intentions to be.
D. The Limitations of Liability in Fraud
So we have two ways parties might use fraud liability to circumvent the
rules against penalties and punitive damages and contract for effective duties
not to obstruct recovery. The first is by including in the contract a duty to
make a representation about performance; the second is by representing an
intent not to obstruct. These fraud solutions are, however, second best.
This is most obvious with respect to liability for misrepresentations of
intent. While credible representations of intent to cooperate in recovery can
provide some additional assurance at the outset of the transaction, such
representations offer less protection than an effective contractual duty. For one
thing, people change their minds. The promisor who now intends to cooperate

118.

119.

Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Robison, No. 01 Civ. 6415, 2002 WL 272406, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 2002). Representatives of the Beatles have recently made similar allegations against
Capitol Records. See Apple Corps Ltd. v. Capitol Records, Inc., No. 05-604385, slip op. at 45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Aug. 23, 2006).
Sony Music, 2002 WL 272406, at *2 . The district court dismissed the claim based on a line of
cases of dubious authority that suggest promissory fraud is not actionable in New York. See
Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., May 2006, at 26, 27.
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in recovery may have a change of heart after breach, when he is faced with a
choice between, say, falsifying records and paying a large damage award. There
are also familiar problems of evidence. While it is sometimes possible to prove
the promisor’s bad initial intent—the smoking-gun internal memo outlining a
plan to falsify records, repeated instances of similar behavior—the promisor’s
intent at the time of promising is typically much more difficult to prove than a
mutually agreed upon contractual duty not to obstruct.
Opting into fraud liability with contractual duties to represent
performance, in the form of certificates of compliance, performance records, or
other required reports, provides a more practically powerful tool. But here too
there are limits. Most obviously, fraud requires misrepresentation. Fraud
liability is therefore of no use against obstruction that does not involve a lie,
like not keeping records or even destroying records. Moreover, if contractual
duties to speak cannot support claims of fraudulent concealment, parties will
not be able to craft the duties to share information in the most effective or
efficient way.
Fraud also has more elements than breach of contract. While I have argued
that this is a good thing with respect to scienter, the reliance element can create
an unwanted hurdle. In Hunt Petroleum Corp. v. Alabama, the Alabama
Supreme Court found insufficient proof of reliance where there was evidence
that the state intended to audit royalty statements, and it could not show that it
changed its position based on the false reports.120 In fact, one can imagine the
reliance requirement giving rise to a catch-22 of its own. If a royalty recipient
can discover underpayments only by exercising its auditing rights, and if
exercising those rights entails not relying on the royalty reports, then false
reports can never support a claim of fraud.
Yet another downside concerns the parties’ ability to control their exposure
to legal liability. When courts permit fraud liability between contracting
parties, they often refuse to enforce the parties’ attempts to limit their
exposure. Thus the Delaware Court of Chancery recently held in ABRY
Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition L.L.C. that “when a seller intentionally
misrepresents a fact embodied in a contract—that is, when a seller lies—public
policy will not permit a contractual provision to limit the remedy of the buyer
to a capped damage claim.”121 Whatever the merits of this rule, familiar worries
about plaintiff-friendly juries and insufficient judicial oversight mean that

120.
121.
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901 So. 2d 1, 6-9 (Ala. 2004).
891 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2006); see also id. at 1056-62 (discussing authorities);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (2006) (“A term exempting a party from
tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy.”); Davis, supra note 5, at 488-92, 513-20 (summarizing relevant holdings).
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many parties will shy away from liability in fraud as a means of securing noobstruct duties.
Finally, there may well be good arguments for a default rule of no liability
for fraud in the performance. There are many representations about
performance for which the parties want only contract remedies, the most
obvious example being warranties. Nor is every contractually required
representation a representation about first-order performance. Statements of
an appraiser about the value of a property, for example, are not about the
appraiser’s performance, but elements of it. Lastly, there is a legitimate worry
that fraud liability for express, contractually required representations will
evolve into a more general cause of action for bad faith breach. Thus when the
trial court in Alabama v. Exxon upheld the jury’s finding of fraud, it pointed not
only to explicit falsehoods in the royalty reports, but also to the implicit
representation in each royalty payment that the payment complied with the
agreement.122 Such reasoning brings us to the place where semantic and legal
analyses diverge. It may well be reasonable to interpret some contract behavior
as implicitly representing conformity with the contract. But it does not follow
that those implicit representations should support a claim of fraud. Where the
parties have not separately agreed to make representations clearly designed to
promote enforcement, the arguments for permitting the extracompensatory
remedies of fraud lose much of their force. In some cases, it may be that the
parties want duties not to obstruct and would prefer the extra protection of
fraud liability. But majoritarian and information-forcing considerations, not to
mention worries about a slippery slope, might recommend a default of no
fraud liability, forcing parties who want that extra protection to say so in their
contract.
The analysis of fraud liability has arrived at a curious place. A no fraud
liability default, which requires parties who want such liability expressly to

122.

“With each royalty payment it sent to the State, Exxon effectively represented that (i) it was
paying royalty from gross when it in fact was not, (ii) its gross was less than it in fact was,
(iii) it was paying the State for all gas produced when it in fact was not and/or (iv) it owed
the State less than it in fact did.” Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 26. The trial court’s
theory of fraud was unfortunately expansive in several other directions as well. For one
thing, the court permitted a finding of fraudulent suppression based on the fact that Exxon
withheld or provided only partial royalty reports. Id. at 27; see also Grynberg v. Citation Oil
& Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 498-99 (S.D. 1997) (royalty reports not itemized and
withheld were contrary to contract). Unlike the case where a breaching promisor is
contractually required to report breach and remains silent, here the absence of required
reports or information should have put Alabama on notice that there might be a first-order
breach. Elsewhere the trial court appears to endorse a broader action for bad faith breach:
“Alabama law surely does not permit a business party such as Exxon to breach a contract as
it sees fit without fear of punitive damages.” Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 23.
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agree to it, looks more like a rule of contract than one of tort. Practically
speaking, it simply permits the parties to attach a certain extracompensatory
remedy (punitive damages) to a certain category of contract terms (duties to
represent). But now it is difficult to see why we should not also permit parties
to specify the extracompensatory remedies they want (adverse inferences,
penalties, damage caps) and to attach them to the terms that will be most
effective (no-obstruct duties that may not involve representations). The better
solution is the contractual one.
iv. the utility of contractual duties not to obstruct
Parts I and II demonstrated that parties can contract for effective noobstruct duties only if they can also attach penalties or punitive damages to
their breach. Part III showed that duties to represent performance backed by
the law of fraud can play the same role and suggested that the existence of such
terms is evidence that parties want effective contractual duties not to obstruct. I
have not yet discussed the costs of penalties and punitive damages, or weighed
them against the potential benefits of effective duties to cooperate. This Part
returns to the level of theory and fills in that analysis. I first show that many of
the costs commonly associated with penalties and punitive damages—such as
preventing efficient breach, creating bad investment incentives, and
incentivizing opportunistic litigation—are much less likely to apply when those
remedies are attached to no-obstruct terms. Fulfilling a promise from Part I, I
then argue that extracompensatory remedies for obstructive breach will often
be the preferred alternative to a more familiar solution to underenforcement:
first-order damage multipliers.
A. The Costs of Penalties and Punitive Damages
There is broad agreement in the economic literature that, in most contexts,
parties prefer compensatory or subcompensatory damage measures for breach
of contract, with some version of expectation damages often identified as
optimal.123 The arguments for why this is so have evolved over the years to the

123.
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See, e.g., Rea, supra note 63, at 159 (“[T]he parties to a contract are unlikely to agree ex ante
to damages that exceed the expected loss.”); Schwartz, supra note 64, at 370 (“[P]romisees
do not want contractual damage measures that would grant more than their lost
expectation.”).
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point where they are fairly subtle. For present purposes, a generic blueprint
will suffice.124
Most familiarly, supercompensatory damages (penalties or punitive
damages) threaten efficient breach. The bilateral monopoly every contract
creates makes renegotiation difficult, meaning that a promisor faced with a
penalty or punitive damages is likely to perform in situations where there is
more value in breach.125 Supercompensatory damages also create the wrong
incentives earlier in the transaction. The promisor, fearing the large payout
should he breach, will invest an inefficient amount to ensure his performance,
while the promisee, who now prefers breach to performance, will take too few
precautions against nonperformance. In fact, supercompensatory damages
create a moral hazard for the promisee, giving her a reason to try to induce and
even falsely allege breach.126 Finally, supercompensatory damages are unlikely
to result in risk-shifting benefits. The greater the liability a promisor faces for
breach, the more he will charge the promisee up front. But most promisees are
either risk-neutral or risk-averse, meaning they will not want to pay more now
to gamble on the chance of a big payoff for nonperformance later.127 Taken
together, these bad incentives decrease the aggregate gains of trade from the
transaction. That is, they decrease the size of the pie the parties have to divide
between them, a result no one prefers.128 If the above considerations apply
equally when supercompensatory damages are attached to no-obstruct terms,

124.

125.

126.
127.

128.

For more detailed versions, see Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the
Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988); Rea, supra note 63, at 151-63;
Schwartz, supra note 64, at 372-83; and Talley, supra note 60, at 1212-18. The core argument
presented here omits some considerations, such as the use of penalties as signals, their
employment as strategic barriers to entry, and their effect on price and selection, as well as
economic arguments that, in special circumstances, extracompensatory remedies can
promote efficient investment. For a detailed overview of the literature, see Edlin & Schwartz,
supra note 4.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 117-18 (6th ed. 2003); Talley, supra
note 60, at 1218-41. But see Clarkson et al., supra note 60, at 360-62; Dodge, supra note 59, at
632-33, 666-76 (arguing that renegotiation is possible); Goetz & Scott, supra note 63, at 587.
This moral hazard problem is emphasized by Clarkson et al., supra note 60, at 368-72. See
also Craswell, supra note 124, at 646-53, 656-61; Rea, supra note 63, at 155.
See Craswell, supra note 124, at 642-45; Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The
Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2230 (1999); Rea, supra note
63, at 152-54; Schwartz, supra note 64, at 392.
Samuel Rea summarizes the arguments as follows: “Penalty clauses are costly because they
(1) induce excessive precautions by the promisor, (2) induce deficient precautions by the
promisee, (3) overinsure the promisee, and (4) expose the promisor to additional risk.” Rea,
supra note 63, at 156.
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then even if the law were to permit parties to choose penalties or punitive
damages, they would be unlikely to do so.
But those considerations do not apply equally. Duties to cooperate share
four general features that distinguish them from first-order terms. First,
compliance is relatively cheap. The affirmative no-obstruct duties I have
described entail only minor administrative costs—keeping records, making
reports, and the like. And prohibitions on bad acts, like falsifying records or
hiding breach, cost less to perform than to breach, since it takes effort to
engage in that obstructive behavior.129 Second, the benefits of cooperative
performance (increased chance of recovery) are transaction specific. Combined
with the fact that performance is cheap, this makes it unlikely that
circumstances will arise in which the resources used to perform a no-obstruct
duty will create more value invested elsewhere. That is, the opportunity costs
of performing are minimal or nonexistent. Third, we can predict that many
promisors going into the transaction will expect to comply with no-obstruct
duties. This is not only because of low compliance and opportunity costs, but
also because those duties are special examples of the general virtues of honesty
and good faith—behaviors many promisors are inclined toward anyway.
Finally, the promisee’s reliance on no-obstruct duties is of a different sort from
her first-order reliance. She relies not on sharing in extralegal gains of trade,
but on the vindication of a purely legal and distributive right—her right to be
made whole in the case of first-order breach.
These four characteristic features of contract duties to cooperate entail that
many inefficiencies commonly associated with penalties and punitive damages
do not apply when those remedies are attached to no-obstruct terms. Perhaps
the most important difference is that compliance with the no-obstruct duties is
generally cheap or free, with respect to both out-of-pocket costs and
opportunity costs. As a result, obstructive breach is far less likely to result in a
more efficient reallocation of resources. That is, it is unlikely that the promisee
will choose to obstruct because the costs of cooperation have gone up or
because those resources could generate more value elsewhere. Obstructive
breach is rarely efficient.
Willful obstructive breach is more likely opportunistic—an attempt to
recapture a piece of the contractual pie that was bargained away, rather than
reallocating resources to create more value.130 Opportunism not only creates no

129.
130.
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See Sanchirico, supra note 17, at 1352-60.
For a detailed analysis of the concept of opportunistic breach, see Timothy J. Muris,
Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521-26 (1981). See also
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089,
1139 n.118 (1981) (“[O]pportunistic behavior only redistributes portions of an already
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added value, but the threat of opportunistic breach sucks resources from the
transaction, as “potential opportunists and victims expend resources
perpetrating and protecting against” it.131 Discouraging opportunistic breaches
with penalties or punitive damages is therefore not merely efficiency neutral,
but represents a net gain in value. In Richard Posner’s oft-quoted words: “If a
promisor breaks his promise merely to take advantage of the vulnerability of
the promisee . . . we might as well throw the book at [him].”132
But not all breaches are intentional. Even where compliance is cheap, a
promisor facing huge liability for obstructive breach might invest too much to
guarantee that no mistakes are made. A penalty or punitive damages clause
might cause him to triple-check records, overmonitor employees, or run every
certificate of compliance by his lawyer—wasted effort as far as everyone is
concerned.133
The discussion of fraud liability provides the answer: we can predict that
contracts that attach penalties or punitive damages to no-obstruct terms will
limit those remedies to intentional or reckless obstructive breaches. That is,
parties will contract for an advantage of fraud liability: scienter. Requiring
proof of scienter insulates the promisor from liability for mere negligence or
reasonable mistake.134 More to the point, by limiting penalties and punitive

131.
132.

133.

134.

allocated contractual pie.”); Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An
Economic Argument for the Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of
Contract, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 877, 880 (1992) (“The opportunistic actor creates more value for
himself, but only by taking an equivalent amount or more from others.”).
Muris, supra note 130, at 524.
POSNER, supra note 125, at 118; see also Dodge, supra note 59, at 654-62 (arguing that punitive
damages for opportunistic breach result in greater efficiency); Richard A. Posner, CommonLaw Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 745-47 (2006)
(discussing when punitive damages for breach are appropriate).
Several academics have suggested permitting penalty clauses for opportunistic breach
only, though they have proposed different tests for distinguishing opportunistic from
efficient breach. See Dodge, supra note 59, at 633 n.14 (listing authors who support punitive
damages for opportunistic breach). To the extent that obstructive breaches are very likely to
be opportunistic, my suggestion is consonant with these recommendations.
Efforts to avoid obstruction are wasted when they cost the promisor more than they benefit
the promisee (by providing her needed assurance that she will recover for a first-order
breach). At the time of formation, neither party wants a term that will result in such
inefficient behavior, which decreases the total value of the transaction that the parties have
to divide between themselves. In other words, the promisor is likely to pass some or all of
the costs of wasted effort on to the promisee in the form of a higher price.
See Dodge, supra note 59, at 651-98 (recommending punitive damages for willful, as
opposed to involuntary, breach).
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damages to intentional and reckless obstructive breaches, the parties can give
each other a reason to take only reasonable precautions against obstruction.
Contracting for scienter also addresses two other costs commonly
associated with extracompensatory remedies: promisee efforts to prevent,
rather than promote, promisor performance and false allegations of breach.
One answer to the first worry is that it is difficult for the promisee to interfere
with the performance of no-obstruct duties. For instance, neither
recordkeeping nor truthful reporting requires promisee cooperation—each is
entirely in the power of the promisor. As for the second, the parties can choose
to penalize only forms of obstruction where false positives are unlikely,
diminishing the danger of false claims for breach. Contracting for scienter adds
another layer of protection against both dangers. If it is difficult to induce
obstructive breach in general, it is doubly difficult to induce an intentional or
reckless obstructive breach. And adding a scienter requirement makes it even
less likely that the promisee will win a nonmeritorious suit for obstructive
breach.
The remaining two reasons that penalties and punitive damages are usually
inefficient can be dealt with in short order. If the promisor does not expect to
obstruct recovery and is not worried about false allegations of obstructive
breach, the extra liability costs him very little, meaning there are fewer costs to
pass along. The result is likely to be positive for a risk-averse promisee. While
she might pay slightly more for a penalty or punitive damages clause, the extra
assurance of first-order recovery is worth the price.135 Nor need we worry so
much about promisee overreliance on no obstructive breach. While first-order
reliance often involves transaction-specific investment in the value-creating
activity, when it comes to no-obstruct terms, the promisee is relying on the
vindication of her legal right to recover for any first-order breach. It is hard to
imagine what would count as overreliance on a legally guaranteed remedy.
There is yet another cost to consider, one unique to no-obstruct duties.
Chris Sanchirico has recently identified a commonly overlooked downside of
penalizing certain forms of obstruction: the higher the penalty for attempts to
avoid detection of a wrong, the greater the wrongdoer’s incentive to take
additional steps to hide those attempts to avoid detection.136 There are two
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This is another way of putting the familiar observation that extracompensatory remedies
can be a cost-effective means of communicating a high probability of performance. See
POSNER, supra note 125, at 128; Rea, supra note 63, at 156-57.
Sanchirico, supra note 17, at 1352-82. One difference between my category of obstruction of
recovery and Sanchirico’s detection avoidance is that Sanchirico is mainly interested in
criminal and regulatory sanctions. As a result, he focuses on how to prevent attempts to
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negative efficiency implications. First, the resources expended on the added
detection avoidance are “[f]rom a societal perspective . . . deadweight loss.”137
Second, increasing the penalty for obstructive breach will be ineffective if that
penalty does not deter the bad behavior, but instead results in successful efforts
to obstruct recovery for the obstructive breach. That is, if Sanchirico’s analysis
is correct, extracompensatory remedies for obstructive breach have an
inefficiency all their own. Penalizing attempts to obstruct recovery might not
deter obstruction, but result instead in expenditures to obstruct recovery for
the obstruction of recovery, and then attempts to obstruct any recovery for that
obstruction, and so on.138
Sanchirico’s argument, however, does not take full account of the fact that
it becomes more and more difficult to avoid detection as one moves up the
ladder to higher orders of obstruction. Fabrications become more complex and
less plausible; the points of possible detection increase; the wrongdoer has
fewer resources and options moving forward. A web of lies is less stable than a
single lie, and the more extended and extensive the cover-up, the more costly
and precarious it becomes. While in some cases penalties might make it worth

137.
138.

avoid punitive first-order sanctions, a problem with a slightly different structure than trying
to prevent attempts to avoid compensatory damages.
Id. at 1337; see also id. at 1352-60 (describing costs of detection avoidance).
The “and so on” leads Sanchirico to make another, more ambitious claim:
Sanctioning activity X encourages another activity X+1 in the form of effort
exerted to avoid detection of X by those who still choose to engage in X.
Stating the principle in these general terms makes clear that it is recursive.
Because the formula applies to any activity X, we are free to substitute “detection
avoidance” itself for X, whereby it begets an X+1 equal to effort exerted to avoid
detection of detection avoidance. Indeed, nothing stops us from returning to the
formula with “detection avoidance of detection avoidance,” substituting this for
X, and generating, as X+1, effort exerted to avoid detection of detection avoidance of
detection avoidance. And we may continue like this ad infinitum, repeatedly
inputting the last application’s output.
Id. at 1368. I do not think the recursivity claim is essential to Sanchirico’s argument as a
whole. In any case, it appears overstated. One typically says that a series is “recursive” only if
its definition applies the same function to each member of the series to arrive at the next.
But as Sanchirico recognizes, the incentives to engage in detection avoidance vary from one
level to the next. Id. at 1369. A wrongdoer’s reasons to engage in X+1-level detection
avoidance depend not only on the penalty for X-level detection avoidance, but also on the
out-of-pocket cost of X+1-level detection avoidance, its chances of success, and its
probability of detection. The latter factors vary stochastically from one level to the next,
depending on the context. There is no a priori reason to think that there will not be some
level of detection avoidance where the next higher level will, as a factual matter, be so
difficult that it will not be worth the cost (perhaps even without a higher-order penalty),
putting an end to the regress.
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investing to hide one’s detection avoidance, rarely will it be worth investing
significant additional resources to hide those investments. In many
circumstances, even the first step will not be worth the effort. There is no a
priori reason to expect that the parties will not be able to locate specific duties
to cooperate in recovery that do not entail the special costs Sanchirico
identifies.
I conclude that attaching penalties and punitive damages does not cost as
much when attached to obstructive breach as when applied to first-order
breach. When those remedies are necessary to secure effective duties not to
obstruct, the added benefit of making the deal happen may be well worth the
cost of the extracompensatory remedy.
B. Multipliers
That penalties and punitive damages for obstructive breach can be worth
the price does not entail that they are the most cost-effective response to the
problem of underenforcement. There is another, more familiar solution:
damage multipliers. Multiplying verified first-order losses by the reciprocal of
the probability of enforcement ratchets awards up to where the risk-neutral or
risk-preferring promisee is fully insured against breach, and the promisor has
the right incentives to perform.139 Even if the benefits of an effective noobstruct term outweigh the costs of its extracompensatory remedy, a firstorder damage multiplier might bring the same or greater benefit at a lower
price.
The relative costs of different contract terms are highly fact dependent and
vary from transaction to transaction. There might well be situations where a
multiplier is the cheaper alternative, and perhaps the law should allow parties
to opt for multiplied damages. But multipliers are not free. While a complete
analysis of the relative costs and benefits, across different transaction types, of
damage multipliers versus extracompensatory remedies for obstructive breach

139.
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On the potential economic utility of damage multipliers, see Robert D. Cooter, Punitive
Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989); and A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869
(1998). For some of the complications in establishing the proper multiplier and alternative
approaches, see Craswell, supra note 127; and Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should
Tort Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 388 (2005).
The statement that multiplied compensatory damages give the promisor the right
incentive to perform glosses over a number of complexities in the attempt to use a single
remedy to induce both sides to behave efficiently throughout the entire transaction. See
generally Craswell, supra note 124; Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question?
Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 907-10 (2003).

0002.KLASS

10/25/2007 11:02 AM

contracting for cooperation in recovery

would be interesting, here I will simply note some of the most significant and
sometimes neglected costs of multipliers in the contract setting. I hope this will
be sufficient to show that there are circumstances in which a duty to cooperate
backed by penalties or punitive damages is the preferred alternative.
Multipliers come in two basic varieties. Static multipliers are fixed by law
or by contract, while dynamic multipliers are determined after finding a firstorder wrong on the basis of an additional finding as to the probability of
enforcement. While a static multiplier corrects for the average or expected
chance of nonenforcement, a dynamic multiplier corrects for the chance of
nonenforcement in this case, taking into account the unique history of the
transaction, including the defendant’s behavior in it.140
Static multipliers are easy to administer, but have obvious drawbacks.
Unlike penalties and punitive damages, which are meant to ensure
performance, multipliers are supposed to ensure that the promisor fully
internalizes the costs of his behavior (harm to the promisee) and therefore has
the right incentives to perform or breach. If the multiplier is set by contract, the
parties must predict the probability of enforcement in advance. When that
prediction turns out to be wrong, the multiplier will result in too few or too
many breaches. This is not a problem when it comes to penalties and punitive
damages. By erring on the side of a greater sanction, the parties or the court
can ensure that bad behavior is deterred for a range of enforcement
probabilities.141

140.

141.

In practice, most multipliers are not simply dynamic or static, but somewhere in between,
depending on how fine-grained or fact-dependent they are. The idea of a “perfectly”
dynamic multiplier is a theoretical fiction, useful in my analysis, but not to be mistaken as a
description of how any multiplier actually works.
Richard Craswell reports: “[M]ost legal systems do not use multipliers that are
calculated case by case. Instead, they use multipliers set at the same level for all defendants,
or fines set at the same level for all defendants, or compensatory damages with no
multipliers at all.” Craswell, supra note 127, at 2198. Craswell’s article provides the most
comprehensive examination of the relative merits of static and dynamic multipliers. Other
proponents of multipliers often ignore the issue. Polinsky and Shavell, who are relatively
optimistic about the ability of factfinders to calculate the probability of enforcement, still
recognize the danger of error and recommend that “the legislature . . . set damages
multipliers for separate categories of wrongful conduct, based on rough assessments of the
different chances of escaping liability in the various settings.” Polinsky & Shavell, supra note
139, at 893.
This point is a variation on Robert Cooter’s observation that when “lawmakers can identify
socially desirable behavior, but are prone to error in assessing the cost of deviations from it,
then sanctions are preferable to prices.” Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1523, 1524 (1984). The multiplier option shows that the relevant difficulty can include
not only “assessing the costs of deviation,” but also assessing the probability of enforcement.
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But the problem with static multipliers is not only epistemic. A static
multiplier does not change depending on the parties’ behavior. But the
multiplier affects that behavior, and that changed behavior can in turn affect
the actual probability of enforcement. Craswell describes potential benefits of
this interplay.142 When good behavior leads to a lower probability of
enforcement (e.g., in the regulatory context), a static multiplier gives potential
defendants more reason to be good: doing so helps avoid even greater liability.
But there is also the effect Sanchirico emphasizes: the more costly the remedy,
the greater the incentive to engage in bad behavior to avoid it. Where the
promisee is particularly worried about obstruction, she will not want a static
multiplier, which would give the breaching promisor all the more reason to try
to escape liability—all the more reason to obstruct recovery.143 It is true that the
parties could choose an even higher multiplier to account for the new
incentives—one that assumes obstruction. But now we are in the realm of the
absurd: to secure efficient incentives for first-order breach, the parties contract
for inefficient obstruction of first-order recovery. Rather than increasing the
incentive to engage in such bad-faith behavior, it is better simply to prohibit it,
which means a no-obstruct term backed by an extracompensatory remedy.
Dynamic multipliers do not create new incentives to obstruct. Quite the
opposite: a perfectly dynamic multiplier renders obstruction otiose. The more
the promisor obstructs recovery, the lower the probability of enforcement, the
greater the multiplier, and the greater the potential damage award. Whether
the breaching promisor helps or hinders recovery, the anticipated, riskadjusted damage amount remains the same. A perfectly dynamic multiplier,
therefore, both robs obstructive behavior of any benefit and perfectly insures
the risk-neutral promisee against obstruction. Dynamic multipliers also share
an advantage of generic fee-shifting and prejudgment-interest clauses: if it
works, a dynamic multiplier applies to all postbreach obstructive behavior,
whether anticipated in the contract or not.144

142.
143.
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Craswell, supra note 127, at 2193-94.
Alan Schwartz has identified a related problem with static multipliers: because the
probability that the promisee will sue is endogenous, a function of the damage measure
itself, the parties will find it difficult to agree on the right multiplier. Schwartz, supra note
64, at 399-401. And Ian Weiner notices a similar effect in criminal law: “Raising the
sanction for the original crime may be counterproductive because it will increase the
incentives for criminals to avoid arrest.” Ian C. Wiener, Running Rampant: The Imposition of
Sanctions and the Use of Force Against Fleeing Criminal Suspects, 80 GEO. L.J. 2175, 2182 (1992).
Jennifer Arlen has observed that variable fines for corporate wrongdoing could, in theory,
achieve similar benefits in the criminal context. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 849 (1994). Like me, Arlen thinks the
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There is, however, that crucial caveat: if it works. Dynamic multipliers face
new epistemic hurdles, for they work only if the promisor’s obstructive
behavior’s effect on the probability of enforcement is both verifiable and
quantifiable. There are reasons to expect that it will be neither.
First, verifiability. If it is possible that the promisor will be held liable for
the underlying breach though his obstructive behavior escapes detection or
proof, the dynamic multiplier will not work. The promisor gets the benefits of
obstructing recovery without paying all the costs, for in some possible futures,
his obstructive behavior will not be factored into the multiplier. The same
applies if there is asymmetric information about the effectiveness of an
obstructive tactic—if the promisor knows that it is more effective than can be
verified in court.145
The second difficulty is quantifying the probability of enforcement. Even if
the factfinder has perfect access to the totality of the facts surrounding the
breach, including the defendant’s obstructive behavior, she still must be able to
extrapolate from those circumstances the numerical probability that, at the
time of nonperformance, the breach would be discovered and verified. There is
no algorithm for arriving at that number. And while empirical studies might
help in arriving at static multipliers,146 the facts and circumstances of each case
are so different that they provide little assistance in calculating dynamic ones.
Quantification requires a judgment call, based on the factfinder’s background

145.

146.

costs of case-by-case calculations of the probability of enforcement “place this solution
beyond the realm of realistic alternatives.” Id.
A society of econometric superheroes could address imperfect verification of obstruction by
adding to the generic first-order multiplier a generic obstruction multiplier. Damages for
first-order breach would then be multiplied twice. The first multiplier would take account of
the probability of enforcement of the first-order breach, given all that is known about the
situation, while proof of obstruction would trigger a second multiplier, designed to account
for the possibility that those obstructive tactics might have gone undetected or unproven.
Mere mortals will find this a difficult solution. First, calculating the appropriate
multiplier would be more complex than simply multiplying by the reciprocal of the
probability that the obstructive behavior in question would go unverified. Such simple
multipliers work only where nonverification results in no damage award. In a dynamic
multiplier regime, no proof of obstructive behavior does not result in no award, but in an
award that is too low. Second, the problem of quantification is even more intractable in the
case of obstruction multipliers, which require the factfinder to evaluate the likelihood that
bad behavior that is designed to be hidden but has been discovered and proven might not
have been.
See Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 388, 403-11 (2005) (deriving generic multipliers from empirical studies of different
categories of tort litigation).
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knowledge and situation sense. As such, it is not only inexact, but prey to
familiar cognitive limitations and biases.147
It would be wrong to draw too strong a conclusion. The point of a damage
multiplier is to give the promisor the right incentives. A multiplier works,
therefore, not when it accurately measures the objective probability of
enforcement, but when it reflects the promisor’s perception of that probability.
While cognitive biases might cause factfinders’ judgments to err systematically,
some of those errors could track promisor judgments. Moreover, while
verification difficulties systematically push damages below the ideal,
quantification errors might be equally distributed above and below it. The
breaching promisor, not knowing where in that range assessed damages will
fall, will assume the average or ideal measurement (as he perceives it).148
Nonetheless, verification and quantification are significant costs of dynamic
multipliers. It is simply expensive to judge after a finding of breach what the
probability of that finding was at an earlier time—expensive both in terms of
the resources required to arrive at a figure and in terms of the risk of error.
Again, penalties and punitive damages for obstructive breach can avoid both
the verification and the quantification problems by erring on the side of a
higher penalty. It is easier to deter than to internalize.
Nor should we forget the other costs of supercompensatory damages for
first-order breach identified in the previous section. Multipliers assume riskneutral or risk-preferring parties, while there are good reasons to think that
most contracting parties are risk averse.149 Where the multiplier is dynamic, the
vagaries of verification and quantification mean even more risk. And multiplied
damages are likely to be especially salient or vivid. While perfectly rational and
risk-neutral parties would not fear multiplied awards, in the real world they
might well interact with the biases of risk-averse parties to deter efficient firstorder breach. More targeted no-obstruct duties backed by penalties or punitive
damages provide an attractive alternative. There may be contexts where firstorder multipliers effectively address concerns about underenforcement, but
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See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of
Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing
Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2111-12
(1998); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 327-32 (1998). But see David Luban, A
Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 369-70 (1998) (questioning Viscusi’s
analysis of juror biases).
See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 139, at 892.
See Craswell, supra note 124, 664-65 (discussing risk aversion and the effect of multipliers on
precaution decisions); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 139, at 886-87 (noting effect of riskaversion on optimal multipliers).
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there are almost certainly transactions where the parties would reasonably
prefer to contract for effective duties not to obstruct.
conclusion
The discussion in this Article has been fairly abstract, but its conclusions
are of more than academic interest. Consider the Department of Defense’s two
contracts with Halliburton subsidiary KBR to restore Iraqi oil infrastructure,
known as “RIO” and “RIO2.”150 A 2006 House Minority report concluded that
KBR had significantly underperformed on both contracts. More importantly, it
found that KBR “leadership demonstrated minimal cooperative attitude
resolving problems,” refusing to allow the government access to information
that would verify its level of performance.151 For instance, it appears that early
in its attempt to drill a pipeline under the Tigris River, KBR learned that
geological conditions would likely prevent its successful performance. KBR,
which was charging the government on a cost-plus basis, did not inform the
Department of Defense of its probable nonperformance, but continued work
and even took steps to hide the difficulties it was encountering.152
Whether or not these reports are accurate (they have not been litigated),
they illustrate why parties might want to write into their contract duties to
cooperate in recovery for first-order breach. The RIO contracts probably
include statutory terms requiring KBR to permit audits and other examination
of records.153 But ensuring performance and recovery for breach might well
require more: contractual duties to keep accurate records of work done, to
cooperate in investigations, and, in the case of the Tigris River project,

150.

151.
152.

153.

See generally MINORITY STAFF OF THE SPEC. INVESTIGATIONS DIV. OF THE H. COMM. ON GOV’T
REFORM, HALLIBURTON’S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE RESTORE IRAQ OIL 2 CONTRACT
(2006).
Id. at 13.
James Glanz, Rebuilding of Iraqi Oil Pipeline as Disaster Waiting To Happen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
25, 2006, at A1. The Times quotes a senior Oil Ministry official, who “said he began hearing
rumors from Iraqis in the ministry in Baghdad that something had gone terribly wrong, but
the company itself seemed determined not to clarify what had happened. ‘We couldn’t get a
good status report,’ Mr. Vogler said. ‘We kept asking for it . . . . We couldn’t get one.’” Id.
The Army Corps of Engineers colonel in charge of the project told the Times that “KBR
provided him with optimistic assessments nearly to the end of the line . . . and he was
convinced that the project would be a success.” Id.
10 U.S.C. § 2313(a)-(c) (2007).
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immediately to report obstacles to performance.154 This Article has shown that
such contractual duties must be backed by extracompensatory remedies if they
are to be effective.
The above analysis recommends several possible reforms. The most general
and effective would be to create an exception to the rules against penalties and
punitive damages allowing parties to attach those remedies to the breach of
duties to cooperate in recovery. Less generally effective, but still a step in the
right direction, would be to clarify the availability of contractually specified
adverse inferences conditioned on obstructive breach. Finally, within the
contract-rule framework, courts should at least permit, absent contractual
language to the contrary, compensatory damages for the additional litigation
costs and prejudgment interest for the delays that obstructive breach causes.
Courts or legislatures could allow parties to adopt some no-obstructive
measures even without changing the law of contract by clarifying that the
economic loss rule and other obstacles to tort liability in the contract context do
not apply to fraudulent obstruction. Minnesota’s codification of the economic
loss rule specifies that it “shall not be interpreted to bar tort causes of action
based upon fraud or fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation or limit
remedies for those actions.”155 This is the better rule (though possibly the
wrong default), for it enables the parties to craft information-sharing
contractual duties to increase the likelihood that, in the case of breach, recovery
will be had.
While I believe the analysis above fully supports these conclusions, I do not
think it is the last word on duties to cooperate in recovery. At least three issues
deserve further research. The first is an empirical hypothesis. This Article has
considered only legal remedies for obstructive breach. In many contexts, such
behavior will be subject to extralegal sanctions that are just as, or more,
important to the parties. Most obviously, in long-term contractual
relationships, obstructive breach may cause one side to end the relationship to
the other’s significant detriment. Alternatively, in some settings obstruction
might be subject to reputational and other extralegal sanctions. The central
conclusion of this paper—that in many cases the parties want no-obstruct
duties, but that to be effective, such duties must be backed by
extracompensatory remedies—suggests that we should expect to find such
obligations where nonlegal sanctions can step in to fill the gap.
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Section 2313 stipulates that it is not to be read to require government contractors to keep any
records other than those they would otherwise maintain in the normal course of business.
Id. § 2313(c)(3).
MINN. STAT. § 604.10(e) (2000); see also Tourek et al., supra note 103, at 927-38 (describing
history of Minnesota statute).
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Second, having argued that the law should permit parties to choose
extracompensatory remedies for obstructive breach, I have not yet fully
analyzed whether or when extracompensatory remedies should be the default.
The most generally effective default remedy for obstructive breach would be
punitive damages. But one can imagine less radical measures, such as the wider
use of adverse inferences. Determining the right default involves a variety of
considerations, none of which are specific to the question of duties to
compensate, but are worth exploring.156
Lastly, my analysis of why the law might want to permit parties to specify
penalties or punitive damages for obstructive breach has been largely
instrumentalist, focusing on how the parties can structure their contracts to get
the best incentives for the least cost. I have not considered how those remedies
fare under any of the nonconsequentialist theories of contract law, many of
which have their own arguments for or against the traditional prohibitions on
extracompensatory contract remedies.157 And contractual duties not to obstruct
raise nonconsequentialist considerations all their own. Such terms not only
protect the promisee’s entitlement to first-order damages, but also modify the
way legal entitlements and sanctions are enforced. Whether to permit the
parties to contract for such duties, therefore, depends in part on whether or to
what extent private persons should be ceded the authority to determine the
enforcement mechanisms that support legally determined transaction
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157.

See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1591 (1999).
See, e.g., KIMEL, supra note 13, at 100-109 (arguing against specific performance remedy
based on Mill’s harm principle); Ian R. Macneil, supra note 60 (applying reliance theory to
justify rule against penalty clauses); Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as
Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 84-102 (2003) (maintaining that principles of
corrective justice argue against punitive damages for breach of contract). But see Curtis
Bridgeman, Note, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56
VAND. L. REV. 237 (2003) (applying corrective justice considerations to argue for punitive
damages in contract).
Special mention should be made of Daniel Markovits’s suggestion that punitive
damages might be appropriate whenever a promisor “refuses to pay the compensatory
expectation damages that vindicating contractual collaboration requires.” Daniel Markovits,
Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1510 (2004). What Markovits is describing here
seems to be, in my terminology, a duty not to obstruct, perhaps akin to that created by
Seaman’s. But I believe that Markovits’s argument entails that both the obligation and the
remedy are mandatory, since both derive from the promisor’s moral duty to treat the
promisee as an end in herself. Cf. id. at 1505-08 (arguing that the parties should not be
allowed to contract for reliance or other sub-expectation damage measures).
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structures.158 The answers to such questions turn on considerations of political
authority and legitimacy that are specific to this area of contract law.

158.
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I borrow this way of posing the question from Alan Klevorick:
[T]he critical observation is that the explication of why some acts are crimes while
others are not requires an inquiry into the legitimation of the transaction
structure. It forces one to confront questions like: Why does the collectivity have
the right to decide the terms on which particular transactions will take place
under different circumstances? Why do some rights reside in the individual while
others rest with the state?
Alan Klevorick, The Economics of Crime, in 27 CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS 288, 303 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985); see also Jules Coleman, Crimes and
Transactions, 88 CAL. L. REV. 921, 924 (2000) (“[S]omeone who violates the transaction
structure has asserted an authority that he does not possess. The power to set the terms of
legitimate transfer resides in the political sovereignty and not in ordinary folk.”).

